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FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY BY OFFERING AMNESTY FOR 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN BANGLADESH: A STIGMA CAN 
NEVER BE A BEAUTY SPOT 
S M Solaiman* 
ABSTRACT 
Black money is a global concern. However, black money has 
disproportionately affected Bangladesh. To combat the proliferation of 
black money in the country, successive governments of Bangladesh 
have offered amnesties to black money holders (BMHs) in 
contravention of the national Constitution, legislation, and 
international conventions. Nonetheless, responses to such incentives 
have been notably poor, mainly because the wrongdoers do not fear 
the superficial threat of law enforcement. This article examines the 
BMHs’ responses to amnesties so far and explains the substantial harm 
caused by such discriminatory favors, including increases in 
corruption, the price of real estate, money laundering, deposits by 
Bangladeshis in Swiss banks, defaulted bank loans, and capital flights. 
To address these problems, this article makes several 
recommendations, including discontinuing amnesties, placing checks 
and controls on corruption, strengthening watchdog and law 
enforcement agencies, incentivizing whistle-blowers and the 
establishment of the Ombudsman’s office, and establishing a new 
statutory body for the assessment of the performance of financial 
regulators. In addition, this article argues that effective measurements 
need to be undertaken to increase global cooperation, enhance public 
awareness, and stimulate social movement. These recommendations 
aim to improve the regulatory regime in Bangladesh in preventing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Money, by itself, has no color. It derives pigment from the 
sources that make it. Within this premise, while there is no universal 
definition of “black money,” it generally implies either income earned 
legally but hidden from tax authorities or money acquired through 
crimes such as bribery, homicide, and terrorism. The most common 
offenses are corruption, bribery, abuse of public office, securities 
fraud, embezzlement, human trafficking, extortion, and drug 
trafficking.1 The United Nations (UN) has set forth 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) for the States to achieve by 2030.2 Goal 16, 
in particular, emphasizes reducing corruption and illicit financial 
flows, which requires States at all levels to “promote peaceful and 
inclusive societies for sustainable development, provide access to 
justice for all and build effective, accountable and inclusive institutions 
at all levels.”3 
The UN recommends achieving these goals by substantially 
reducing corruption and bribery; reducing illicit financial flows; 
developing effective, accountable, and transparent institutions; 
ensuring responsive, inclusive, participatory, and representative 
decision-making; promoting and enforcing non-discriminatory laws 
and policies for sustainable development; strengthening relevant 
national institutions; and ensuring equal access to justice for all.4 
Accordingly, Bangladesh, a South Asian developing country, has 
adopted the SDGs and aims to attain them by 2030. However, the 
country’s SDGs trackers—set out by the Government of Bangladesh as 
of June 2021—do not show any development or even commitment to 
reducing corruption and black money.5 Such silence has led many to 
 
1 Attiya Waris & Laila Abdul Latif, The Effect of Tax Amnesty on Anti-Money 
Laundering in Bangladesh 17(2) J. MONEY LAUND. CONTROL 243, 244 (2014). 
2 Biswajit Bandyopadhyay, Indian Perspective of Anti-Corruption Institutions for 
Combating Corruption in Sustainable Development’ 19(1) DELHI BUS. R. 85, 89 
(2018). 
3 United Nations, Transforming Our World: The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable 
Development, https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (last accessed on June 19, 2021). 
4 Id.; Bandyopadhyay, supra note 2, at 89. 
5 Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics, SDG Trackers─Bangladesh’s Development Mirror 
https://www.sdg.gov.bd/page/thirty_nine_plus_one_indicator/5#1 (last accessed on 
June 19, 2021). 
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wonder how Bangladesh will accomplish Goal 16 by the aspired 
timeline considering that corruption has not only been a critical 
problem since the nation’s independence in 1971, but it has also 
contributed to Bangladesh’s developmental stagnation over the years.6 
In fact, unfortunately, the levels of corruption in Bangladesh continue 
to rise.7 
Corruption is a predominant source of illicit money in 
Bangladesh that eats away at economic development, impairs social 
balance, and smites national attainments. Augustine Nwabuzor, a 
scholar on the subject, describes corruption as a conduct that is 
“extractive in nature” with far-reaching effects on the global economy, 
ultimately warranting interdisciplinary measures to prevent its 
spread.8 Within this realm, good governance is an important tool used 
to fight against corruption. Following the 1990 restoration of 
democracy in Bangladesh, after the ousting of the prolonged autocratic 
rule through a mass upsurge,9 better governance was widely expected. 
But, due to the lack of political will, the successive governments 
frustrated the nation in terms of combating corruption.10  In 2020, the 
government of Bangladesh granted a blanket immunity for 
“whitening” black money by suggesting to incorporate the money into 
the mainstream economy to generate more revenue and create more 
 
6 Nurul Huda Sakib, One Size Does Not Fit All: An Analysis of the Corruption 
Preventative Approach of the Anti-Corruption Commission (ACC) in Bangladesh, 
27(2) ASIAN J. POLITICAL SCI. 211, 211 (2019). 
7 Mahbubur Rahman Khan, ACC Guidelines Can Help Prevent Systemic Graft in 
Government Offices, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) (Mar. 5, 2021), at Opinion. 
8 Augustine Nwabuzor, Corruption and Development: New and Initiatives in 
Economic Openness and Strengthened Rule of Law, 59(1) J. BUS. ETHICS 121, 130 
(2005). 
9 General Hussain Muhammad Ershad came to power through a bloodless coup in 
1982 and remained in power until early December 1990 before he was ousted by an 
uncontrollable mass uprising. See Habib Zafarullah & Muhammad Yeahia Akhter, 
Military Rule, Civilianisation and Electoral Corruption: Pakistan and Bangladesh in 
Perspective, 25(1) ASIAN STUD. R. 73 (2001). 
10 See Mohammad Mohabbat Khan & Md. Shahriar Islam, Democracy and Good 
Governance in Bangladesh: Are They Compatible?, 5(1) MILLENN. ASIA. 23 (2014); 
Habib Zafarullah & Ahmed Shafiqul Huque, Corruption and its Control: The Pursuit 
of Probity in Bangladesh, CORRUPTION IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR: AN INTERNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 59 (Krishna K. Tummala, ed.). 
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jobs; the effort failed to present a benefit to nations around the world.11 
Impunity has been highly criticized by many of Bangladesh’s leading 
economists, legal scholars, business leaders, politicians, the Anti-
Corruption Commission (ACC) Bangladesh, and the Transparency 
International Bangladesh (TIB).12 Flouting all the denunciations, the 
government of Bangladesh has yet again incorporated the whitening 
opportunity into the Finance Act of 2021, which was legislated on June 
20, 2021.13 In fact, ninety-four percent of participants in an online poll 
considered this Act to be the legislation of corruption.14 Despite public 
sentiment, successive governments in Bangladesh have been 
partaking in this practice for decades in violation of the national 
constitution, several pieces of domestic legislation, and international 
obligations. 
Experts cannot pinpoint an exact amount of black money 
located in Bangladesh’s informal or underground economy.15 Some 
commentators have predicted the amount of black money to be around 
37 percent of the gross domestic products (GDP) in Bangladesh,16 
while a study of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) revealed the 
number to be about 33.59 percent of the country’s GDP between the 
 
11 D.S. Sourav, Undisclosed Income Can be Legalized by Paying 10% Tax, DHAKA 
TRIBUNE (Bangl.) (May 22, 2021), at Business. 
12 See S.M. Solaiman, “Black” Money, “White” Owners, and “Blue” Tenants in the 
Bangladesh Housing 
Market, 23(2) J. FIN. CRIME 501 (2016). 
13 Shakhawat Hossain, Bangladesh JS Passes FY22 Finance Bill with Money 
Legalisation Scope, NEW AGE (Bangl.), June 30, 2021, at Bangladesh. 
14 The poll was conducted online by the most popular Bengali national daily, Prothom 
Alo, published on June 30, 2021, immediately after the passing of the Finance Act 
2021 (Bangl.) by the Parliament on June 29, 2021. The question was: “GM Quader 
has said that the opportunity to whiten black money is tantamount to legitimizing 
corruption—do you think so?” Mr G. M. Kader is the President of the main opposition 
party and the Deputy Leader of Opposition in the Parliament. Notably, only 5 percent 
responded saying “No,” whilst 1 percent abstained from making any comment: 
PROTHOM ALO (Bangl.), June 30, 2021, at 1. 
15 The terms “informal economy,” “underground economy,” “hidden economy,” 
“shadow economy,” or “unrecorded economy’’ have been used as synonyms for the 
illicit economy. 
16 Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 244. 
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period of 2004 and 2015.17 Based on an inside analysis of the Finance 
Ministry, the then-Finance Minister of Bangladesh in 2013 stated that 
the total amount of black money was between 41 and 82 percent of the 
nation’s GDP.18 Though amounts differ, it can be said that huge sums 
of ill-gotten money are prowling in the country’s underground 
economy and are being amassed through crimes and used for 
committing further crimes.19 All projected amounts are certainly 
alarming. It is a deep-rooted problem in the country, and no 
government has ever demonstrated any firm commitment to the 
elimination of black money by stringent penalties. Rather, successive 
governments have rewarded BMHs with a sort of general amnesty 
almost every year, seeking economic development and prevention of 
capital flights. People have never accepted that plea for growth; 
instead, they are clearly opposed to such amnesties in Bangladesh.20 
The past Chairman of the ACC, reflecting on its five-year term ending 
in March 2021, admitted that “it is not worth our time denying that 
corruption in Bangladesh persists in a wider expanse.”21 Over the past 
nine years, irregularities have increased 16 times in four state-owned 
 
17 Leandro Medina & Friedrich Schneider, Shadow Economies Around the World: 
What Did We Learn Over the Last 20 Years? (Jan. 24, 2018, IMF, WP/18/17), 
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WP/Issues/2018/01/25/Shadow-Economies-Ar
ound-the-World-What-Did-We-Learn-Over-the-Last-20-Years-45583(last accessed 
on July 6, 2021). 
18 Asjadul Kibria, White Paper on Black Money, Financial Express (Bangl.), July 11, 
2019, at Views. The GDP Of Bangladesh Was US$324.239 Billion in 2020: Aaron 
O’Neill, Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in Bangladesh 2026 (Apr. 21, 2021), 
https://www.statista.com/statistics/438219/gross-domestic-product-gdp-in-banglades
h/(last accessed on June 21, 2021). 
19 Two high profile examples of this criminal conduct are: First, police recovered 
BDT20 crore (US$2.410 million) from Lutfozzaman Babar (State Home Minister of 
the day) who received this large amount from the owner of a well-known Bashundhara 
Group of Industries in exchange for exonerating son (main suspect) of the said owner 
from the murder charge of killing a director of the same conglomerate: Z Ahsan, Tk 
20 Crore Bashundhara Bribe Recovered from Babar, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 31, 
2007. Second, Justice Surendra Kumar Sinha, former Chief Justice of Bangladesh, has 
been facing prosecution for committing embezzlement and laundering money, while 
he worked as the Chief Justice of Bangladesh: Md. Sanaul Islam Tipu, Former Chief 
Justice SK Sinha, 10 Others Indicted in Money Laundering, Embezzlement Case, 
DHAKA TRIBUNE (Bangl.), August 13, 2020, at Bangladesh. 
20 See Solaiman, supra note 12, at 502. 
21 Khan, supra note 7. 
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banks alone.22 Apart from a few businesses, such as the real estate and 
stock market, the whole nation and its civil society, think-tanks, rights 
groups, and prominent citizens all overtly oppose this amnesty.23 
Nonetheless, amnesty remains commonplace in Bangladesh. As seen 
over the past decades, only a small number of BMHs legitimize their 
illicit money through these amnesties, while most black money 
remains black and is either laundered or spent to enjoy a luxurious 
lifestyle. Frequent amnesties stimulate corruption, tax evasion, money 
laundering, drug trafficking, and overall fortification of the black 
economy.24 For example, a survey conducted by TIB found that 89 
percent of people do not get services without paying a bribe.25 
Paradoxically, the current government has declared a fight 
against corruption on the one hand and offered a whitening 
opportunity to BMHs on the other, though these two are mutually 
exclusive by nature. Before the enactment of the Finance Act 2021, the 
Finance Minister declared unwittingly that “the government would 
continue this until the undisclosed money is legalized fully.”26 This is 
in contrast to the Finance Minister’s statement that the government has 
adopted a policy of “zero tolerance” against corruption.27 It is also 
disheartening that the government sometimes recommends the 
withdrawal of corruption cases lodged by the ACC; however, it is 
encouraging that the Supreme Court of Bangladesh (High Court 
Division, hereinafter “HCD”) has reversed such acquittals through 
withdrawal and ordered that the case go to trial in December 2020.28 
Observers widely believe that the problem of political and 
 
22 Mizan Chowdhury, Forgery in State-Owned Banks in Four Years -31 Thousand 
Taka Looted, Jugantor (Bangl.), March 4, 2021, at First page. 
23 Ibrahim Hossain Ovi, Explainer: Black Money — What, Why and How, DHAKA 
TRIBUNE (Bangl.), June 13, 2020, at Business. 
24 Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 247. 
25 Jugantor Report, TIB Survey: 89 Percent People Do Not Get Services without Bribe, 
JUGANTOR (Bangl.) September 27, 2019; see also Badiuzzaman Bay, Corruption has 
spread over the whole society, DAILY STAR (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.thedailystar.
net/opinion/interviews/news/corruption-has-spread-over-the-whole-society-2008101. 
26 B.S.S., Kamal: Black Money Whitening Scheme Will Remain, DHAKA TRIBUNE 
(Bangl.), May 19, 2021, at Business. 
27 Kibria, supra note 18. 
28 M. Moneruzzaman, Graft case withdrawal by govt ‘naked interference’, NEW AGE 
(Jan. 13, 2021), https://www.newagebd.net/article/127090/graft-case-withdrawal-by-
govt-naked-interference. 
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bureaucratic nepotism is closely linked to black money. It unveils the 
government’s lack of political will, which is key to reducing 
corruption.29 Alongside political will, an effective anti-corruption 
movement enables the government to make effective laws and ensure 
their enforcement.30 Scholar Douglass C. North underscores the need 
for an efficient legal system alongside a conducive institutional 
environment for anti-corruption institutions to have the capability to 
defuse corruption.31 
This article aims to examine the legality, benefits, and 
detriments of the past amnesties offered to BMHs and concludes that 
such a practice goes against the constitutionally guaranteed equality 
before the law, contravenes anti-corruption and anti-money 
laundering (AML) laws, encourages proliferation of black money, 
stimulates dishonesty, effectively punishes honesty, and reduces tax 
revenues eventually harming the national economy and society at 
large. This article consists of five sections. Following this introduction 
in Section I, Section II analyzes the contraventions of laws and the 
State’s international obligations by the amnesties offered to BMHs. 
Section III considers BMHs’ responses to the amnesties granted since 
the country’s independence and their impacts. Section IV discusses 
specific measures that need to be undertaken to prevent proliferation 
and exploitation of black money. Finally, Section V summarizes 
discussions and makes several recommendations. 
I. AMNESTIES IN CONTRAVENTION OF THE NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTION, DOMESTIC LEGISLATION, AND INTERNATIONAL 
OBLIGATIONS 
The government has the obligation not to offer such 
unconstitutional, discriminatory, unlawful, and unethical amnesties to 
BMHs in Bangladesh. First, such amnesties go against the core 
provisions of the Constitution of Bangladesh of 1972. For example, the 
 
29 Jon S.T. Quah, Evaluating the effectiveness of anti-corruption agencies in five Asian 
countries: A comparative analysis, 4 ASIAN EDUC. AND DEV. STUDIES 143, 146 
(2015). 
30 Sakib, supra note 6, at 229. 
31 See Douglass C. North, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE (1990). 
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amnesty is discriminatory in that it allows the BMHs to pay only 10 
percent tax to whiten their illicit money, whereas honest taxpayers are 
required to pay 25 to 30 percent tax on their legitimate incomes.32 This 
discrimination directly contravenes Article 27 of the Constitution, 
which affirms that “[a]ll citizens are equal before law and are entitled 
to equal protection of law.”33 This is a constitutionally guaranteed 
fundamental right of the citizens, which cannot be taken away by any 
ordinary legislation like tax or finance laws. As for the legal superiority 
of fundamental rights, Article 7(2) of the Constitution declares its 
supremacy and pronounces that the “Constitution is . . . the supreme 
law of the Republic, and if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution that other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, be 
void.”34 Consistently, Article 7(1) provides that “[a]ll powers in the 
Republic belong to the people, and their exercise on behalf of the 
people shall be effected only under, and by the authority of, this 
Constitution” (Italics added). “This implies that all law-making 
bodies, persons or authorities are proscribed from enacting any law 
which is inconsistent with, or repugnant to, the Constitution. It is 
therefore legally binding for Parliament to make law in compliance 
with the constitution.”35 As a further guarantee of fundamental rights, 
Article 26(2) unequivocally prevents the State from making any law 
repugnant to these rights, providing that “[t]he State shall not make 
any law inconsistent with any provisions of this Part, and any law so 
made shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, be void.”36 The 
provision of discriminatory tax treatment undermines the basic 
structure of the Constitution as held by the Supreme Court of India in 
Mardia Chemicals v. Union of India37 because loyal taxpayers are being 
 
32 Trading Economics, Bangladesh Personal Income Tax Rate, TRADING ECONOMICS, 
https://tradingeconomics.com/bangladesh/personal-income-tax-rate (last accessed on 
June 30, 2021). 
33
 BANGL. CONST. pt. I art.7. 
34
 BANGL. CONST. pt. I art. 7(2). 
35 M. Rafiqul Islam, The Seventh Amendment to the Constitution of Bangladesh: A 
Constitutional Appraisal, 58 POL. QUARTERLY 312, 326 (1987). 
36 The word “Part” within the quotation refers to Part III of the Constitution consisting 
of Articles 26–47A. 
37 Abhinav Chandrachud, How Legitimate is Non-Arbitrariness? Constitutional 
Invalidation in the Light of Mardia Chems v. Union of India, 2 INDIAN J. OF CONST. 
L. 179, 180–182 (2008) (noting that the Constitution of Bangladesh has generously 
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punished with higher taxes while their disloyal or dishonest 
counterparts are being rewarded with the amnesty and may pay a 
lower tax rate. 
Apart from the fundamental right, the amnesty further 
contravenes Article 20(2) of the Constitution, which provides that the 
“State shall endeavour to create conditions in which, as a general 
principle, persons shall not be able to enjoy unearned incomes[.]”38  
Unlike Article 27, Article 20(2) is a fundamental principle of state 
policy, which is not directly enforceable under Article 8(2).  However, 
the highest court of Bangladesh has arguably mandated the indirect 
enforceability of these principles. For example, in 1989, the Supreme 
Court of Bangladesh (Appellate Division, hereinafter “AD”) in a 
leading case, Anwar Hossain v. Bangladesh, pronounced that: 
Though the directive principles are not enforceable by 
any court, the principles therein laid down are 
nevertheless fundamental in the governance of the 
country and it shall be the duty of the state to apply 
these principles in making laws. It is a protected 
Article [Article 8] in our Constitution and the 
legislature cannot amend this Article without 
referendum. This alone shows that the executive 
cannot flout the directive principles. The endeavour of 
the Government must be to realise these aims and not 
to whittle them down.39 
Likewise, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh in Kudrat-E-Elahi 
Panir v. Bangladesh held that the fundamental principles of Articles 8–
25 have to be applied in making laws.40 Consistently, the Supreme 
 
borrowed from that of India, which is regarded as the established largest democracy 
in the world. Accordingly, there are great similarities between the fundamental 
principles of state policy, fundamental rights and provisions for their protection as 
enshrined in these two constitutions. This justifies the relevance and applicability of 
Indian judicial interpretations in understanding the corresponding provisions of the 
Constitution of Bangladesh). 
38
 BANGL. CONST. pt. II art. 20(2). 
39 Chowdhury v. Bangladesh, (1989) 18 CLC 1, 61 (Bangl.) (referring to “directive 
principles” as the fundamental principles of state policy). 
40 Kudrat-E-Elahi Panir v. Bangladesh, (1992) 44 DLR 319, 346 (Bangl.). 
52 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
Court (HCD) in Farooque v. Government of Bangladesh pronounced that 
the fundamental principles can be applied in interpreting the 
fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution.41 Moreover, Article 
8(2) itself reads: “The principles set out in this Part shall be 
fundamental to the governance of Bangladesh, shall be applied by the 
State in the making of laws, shall be a guide to the interpretation of the 
Constitution and of the other laws of Bangladesh, and shall form the 
basis of the work of the State and of its citizens[.]”42 Hence, both the 
wording of Article 8(2) and corresponding judicial interpretations of 
the fundamental principles of state policy clearly suggest that 
amnesties to BMHs violate the Constitution. 
When Articles 7, 8, 20, 26 and 27 and pertinent judicial 
interpretations are read together, it can be persuasively argued that the 
laws offering amnesty to BMHs are unconstitutional, unfairly 
discriminatory, and therefore void. To substantiate this view further, 
the Supreme Court of India in Musaliar v. Potti held that discrimination 
with “an evil eye and unequal hand” is void ab initio in law.43  
Furthermore, regarding corruption, the Supreme Court of India in 
Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh observed that “[c]orruption 
devalues human rights, chokes development . . . and undermines 
justice, liberty, equality, [and] fraternity, which are the core values in 
our preambular vision.”44 
Alongside the Constitution, the legalization of black money 
through the granting of amnesties also manifestly contravenes several 
pieces of domestic legislation. For example, in providing a detailed 
definition of money laundering, s2(v) of the Money Laundering 
Prevention Act 2012 (MLPA2012) 45 stipulates that “money 
laundering” means: 
 
41 (1996) 48 DLR 438 (Bangl.). 
42
 BANGL. CONST. pt. II art. 8(2). 
43 Musaliar v. Potti, (1955) AIR 1956 SC 246 (India). 
44 Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh and Another, (2012) 3 SCC 64 (India). 
45 The Bangladesh Money Laundering Act of 2002 was initially supplanted by the 
Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance on April 15, 2008. Subsequently, the 
Ordinance was enacted with the title of the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 
2009, which was repealed by the Money Laundering Prevention Ordinance of 2012, 
followed by the legislation of the Money Laundering Prevention Act of 2012. This 
Act has been further revised by the Money Laundering (Amendment) Act of 2015, as 
incorporated into the current Act in line with the international initiatives and standards. 
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(i) knowingly moving, converting, or transferring 
proceeds of crime or property involved in an offence 
for the following purposes: 
(1) concealing or disguising the illicit nature, 
source, location, ownership or control of the proceeds 
of crime; or 
(2) assisting any person involved in the 
commission of the predicate offence to evade the legal 
consequences of such offence; 
(ii) smuggling money or property earned through 
legal or illegal means to a foreign country; 
(iii) knowingly transferring or remitting the 
proceeds of crime to a foreign country or remitting or 
bringing them into Bangladesh from a foreign country 
with the intention of hiding or disguising its illegal 
source; 
(iv) concluding or attempting to conclude financial 
transactions in such a manner so as to reporting 
requirement under this Act may be avoided; 
(v) converting or moving or transferring property 
with the intention to instigate or assist for committing 
a predicate offence; 
(vi) acquiring, possessing or using any property, 
knowing that such property is the proceeds of a 
predicate offence; 
(vii) performing such activities so as to the illegal 
source of the proceeds of crime may be concealed or 
disguised; and 
(viii) participating in, associating with, conspiring, 
attempting, abetting, instigate [sic] or counsel [sic] to 
commit any offences mentioned above. 
A close reading of the above definition suggests that it leaves 
no room for the granting of amnesties to BMHs. Hence, the then-
Governor of Bangladesh Bank, the central bank of the country, 
perfectly noted that “[e]nforcing the Money Laundering Act on one 
hand and allowing whitening of black money on the other are quite 
54 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
contradictory. As such, it must be stopped.”46 Beyond definition, s4 of 
the MLPA2012 makes money laundering an indictable offense, which 
can be punished with a jail term of at least four years but not exceeding 
12 years and a fine equivalent to twice the value of the property 
involved in the offense or BDT 10 lac (US $12,048), whichever is 
greater. 
The comprehensive definition of money laundering under 
s2(v) and the significant punishment thereof imply that the offense is 
a criminal one.47 Regardless, money laundering is on the rise, taking 
advantage of laxity in oversight, investigation, and enforcement. The 
Anti-Corruption Commission Act of 2004 (Bangladesh) (ACCA2004) 
is another piece of legislation that is starkly flouted by such amnesties. 
Affirming this view, Justice Sultan Hossain Khan asserted, while he 
was Chairman of the ACC, that “[i]t goes against the spirit of the 
constitution of Anti-Corruption Commission. This is self-
contradictory.”48 The provisions of amnesty virtually bury sections 26 
and 23, and contradicts section 24 of the ACCA2004.49 This is so 
because section 26 empowers the ACC to ask anyone to submit all 
necessary statements of their assets, while section 23 entitles the 
watchdog to investigate allegations if it chooses.50 Section 24 ensures 
independence of the ACC by elucidating that “[s]ubject to the 
provisions of this Act, the Commissioners shall be independent in 
discharging their duties under this Act.” Hence, the ACC’s 
independence can only be restrained by this Act. Nonetheless, the 
whitening provisions overtly prevent the ACC from asking any 
question to BMHs who take advantage of the opportunity. 
 
46 Rejaul K. Byron, Immunity to Money Whitening May Go, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) Nov. 
26, 2004, http://archive.thedailystar.net/2004/11/26/d4112601011.htm. 
47 For the definition of a “truly criminal” offense, see He Kaw Teh v The Queen (1985) 
157 CLR 523 (Austl.). 
48 Shamim Ahsan, A Budget Without Direction, STAR WEEKEND MAGAZINE (Jun. 24, 
2005), http://archive.thedailystar.net/magazine/2005/06/04/cover.htm. 
49 Anti-Corruption Commission Act § 38 (Bangl.). 
50 § 26 provides that the “Commission may, by order in writing, direct that person to 
furnish statement of his assets and liabilities including any other information specified 
in that order in the manner prescribed by the Commission.” 
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Accordingly, section 19AAAA of the Income Tax Ordinance 1984 
(Bangladesh)51 as amended in 2020 provides: 
 (1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this 
Ordinance or any other law for the time being in force, 
no question as to the source of any sum invested in 
securities by an individual assessee . . . shall be raised 
by any authority if the assessee pays tax at the rate of 
ten percent (10%) on such investment within thirty 
days from the date of such investment.52 
Similar provisions exist in other sectors. For instance, there are 
provisions relating to the legalization of undisclosed movable or 
immovable property (§ 19AAAAA), investments in buildings or 
apartments (§ 19BBBBB), the purchase of bonds under Bangladesh 
Infrastructure Finance Fund (§ 19C), and the Economic Zones or Hi-
Tech Parks (§ 19DD). All these special tax provisions effectually restrict 
the State’s prospects of inquiring further into undisclosed or illicit cash 
or other property. 
Bangladesh’s core criminal legislation is the Penal Code of 1860 
(PC 1860), which was enacted during the British colonial era, and 
which continues to apply with some minor modifications. The PC 
1860, through sections 162, 163, 165 and 403, criminalizes the corrupt 
practices of public servants that detrimentally affects several public 
interests. Section 161 prohibits public servants from taking 
gratification, other than legal remuneration, and prescribes 
punishments, including imprisonment and potential fines.53 Section 
 
51 All sections of the Income Tax Ordinance referred to in this article are as of June 
30, 2021. 
52 Emphasis added. 
53 § 161 provides: “Whoever, being or expecting to be a public servant, accepts or 
obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain from any person, for himself or for 
any other person any gratification whatever, other than legal remuneration, as a motive 
or reward for doing or forbearing to do any official act or for showing or for bearing 
to show, in the exercise of his official functions, favour or disfavour to any person, or 
for rendering or attempting to render any service or disservice to any person, with the 
Government or Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with 
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with 
fine, or with both.” 
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162 defines “gratification” as the act of corruptly or illegally 
influencing any public servant, the violation of which can be punished 
by a maximum of three years of incarceration, a fine, or both.54 Section 
163 criminalizes the taking of gratification for personal influence if 
done by a public servant.55 A person involved in a legal proceeding 
can be found to be in violation of section 165 if he or she obtains 
information from a public servant without consideration. Section 403 
stipulates that anyone, whether a public servant or not, who 
“dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own use any moveable 
property, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description 
for a term which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.” 
All these provisions succinctly criminalize any corrupt or 
dishonest receipt of financial gains in any form by a public servant. 
Nonetheless, many public servants take illicit property, cash or in-
kind, with almost complete impunity, and they have been doing this 
for a long time. The whitening opportunities also contravene the 
Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 (PCA 1947) (Bangladesh), a short 
piece of legislation deriving offenses from the aforesaid PC 1860. 
Section 3 provides that “[a]n offense punishable under sections 161, 
162, 163, 164, 165A or 165-A of the Penal Code shall be deemed to be a 
cognizable offense for the purposes of the Code of Criminal Procedure 
1898, notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained therein.”  
 
54 § 162 reads as follows: “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts 
to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification 
whatever as a motive or reward for inducing, by corrupt or illegal means, any public 
servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the official 
functions of such public servant to show favour or disfavour to any person, or to render 
or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with the Government or 
Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with imprisonment 
of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with 
both.” 
55 § 163 provides: “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept or attempts to 
obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification 
whatever, as a motive or reward for inducing, by the exercise of personal influence, 
any public servant to do or to forbear to do any official act, or in the exercise of the 
official functions of such public servant to show favour or disfavour to any person, or 
to render or attempt to render any service or disservice to any person with the 
Government or Legislature, or with any public servant, as such, shall be punished with 
simple imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine, or with 
both.” 
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Section 2 of the PCA 1947 defines “public servants” broadly by 
encompassing public servants defined in section 21 of the PC 1860, 
employees of any state-owned enterprises, office bearers of local 
government authorities, “a Chairman, Director, Managing Director, 
Trustee, Member, Officer or other employee of any corporation, or 
other body or organisation constituted or established under any law.” 
Hence, the PCA 1947 effectually reinforces the application of the PC 
1860 to corrupt activities. Without going into further detail, it can be 
noted that in addition to the contraventions of the aforesaid 
constitutional and statutory provisions, there are other laws and rules 
which are flouted by the amnesty in question. Some of these are the 
Government Servants (Conducts) Rules, 1979 (Bangladesh); the 
Government Servants (Discipline and Appeal) Rules 1985 (Bangladesh); the 
Public Procurement Act 2006 (Bangladesh); and the Public Service Act 
2018 (Bangladesh). The transgression against law goes even further. 
As mentioned earlier, the amnesties infringe upon 
international obligations of the State as well. For example, the 
amnesties contravene the United Nations Convention against 
Corruption of 2003 (UNCAC) to which Bangladesh has been a party 
since February 27, 2007.56 The UNCAC covers five main areas of 
corruption that include preventive measures, criminalization and law 
enforcement, international cooperation, asset recovery, and technical 
assistance and information exchange.57 The UNCAC requires each 
State party to take preventive measures against corruption in both the 
public and private sectors and also “to establish criminal and other 
offenses to cover a wide range of acts of corruption, if these are not 
already crimes under domestic law,” and the States are legally obliged 
to establish offenses concerning bribery of national public officials 
under Article 15 of the Convention.58 The amnesties at hand blatantly 
 
56 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41 
(188 parties, including Bangladesh, had accepted it by Feb. 27, 2007). 
57 Id. 
58 Article 15: “Each State Party shall adopt such legislative and other measures as may 
be necessary to establish as criminal offences, when committed intentionally: (a) The 
promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that 
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; (b) 
The solicitation or acceptance by a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
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violate these State obligations because they effectively decriminalize 
the conduct with special advantages being offered to those who are 
potentially offenders although their disputed conduct is required to be 
criminalized by this Convention. 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 (UDHR) 
is regarded as the “Magna Carta”59 for international human rights law. 
Article 7 declares that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled 
without any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are 
entitled to equal protection against any discrimination in violation of 
this Declaration and against any incitement to such discrimination.” 
Although the UDHR is not a legally enforceable instrument, it has 
profoundly influenced most of the national constitutions and several 
international instruments drafted since its inception in 1948.60 
Amongst those international instruments, the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights 1966 (ICCPR), the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR), and the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women 1979 (CEDAW) are directly relevant to the present context of 
discriminatory tax provisions.  Providing a guarantee of equality 
before the law, Article 26 of the ICCPR enunciates that “[a]ll persons 
are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination 
to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit 
any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective 
protection against discrimination on any ground[.]” The ICCPR is a 
legally binding treaty for the ratifying countries, and Bangladesh 
ratified it on September 6, 2000.61 The ICCPR thus applies to the 
discriminatory tax provisions. 
 
advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, in order that 
the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.” 
59 George J. Andreopoulos, Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ENCYCLOPEDIA 
BRITANNICA, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Universal-Declaration-of-Human-
Rights. 
60 Nancy Flowers, A Short History of Human Rights, HUMAN RIGHTS HERE AND NOW, 
http://hrlibrary.umn.edu/edumat/hreduseries/hereandnow/Part-1/short-history.htm 
(last accessed on June 20, 2021). 
61 S. M. Solaiman & Abu Noman Mohammad Atahar Ali, Rampant Food Adulteration 
in Bangladesh: Gross Violations of Fundamental Human Rights with Impunity, 14 
ASIA–PAC. J. HUM. RIGHTS L., nos. 1–2, 2013, at 29, 47. 
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As submitted to the Geneva Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women in 2016, ICESCR and CEDAW bear on 
tax discriminatory treatment indirectly as amnesties contribute to the 
loss of tax revenue, which “deprives States of the maximum available 
resources that could be used to realize substantive equality, respect 
and protect all women’s rights, and progressively fulfil their economic, 
social and cultural rights, in accordance with their obligations under 
CEDAW and ICESCR.”62 Observers add that “[t]ax abuse also has a 
more direct impact on the enjoyment of rights, insofar as it exacerbates 
inequalities and thereby runs counter to the principles of equality and 
non-discrimination.”63 Professor Rehman Sobhan, one of the most 
renowned economists of Bangladesh and Chairman of the Center for 
Policy Dialogue, a national think tank, comments that “[o]ffering such 
whitening facility gives a wrong signal to the taxpayers,”64 and the 
“money whitening process will sharply increase economic 
discrimination in the country.”65 A former Chairman of the National 
Board of Revenue of Bangladesh (NBR) says that the opportunity 
discourages honest people to pay taxes as well as weakens the 
government’s right to collect taxes, effectively resulting in reduction in 
tax revenues.66 Notably, Bangladesh is a party to both of these 
international instruments, and it ratified the ICESCR on October 5, 
1998 and CEDAW on November, 6 1984.67 
Further, the amnesties contravene the international money 
laundering control provisions.  Articles 6–7 of the UN Convention 
against Transnational Organized Crime 2004 (UNCTOC) stipulate that 
every “State Party shall adopt, in accordance with fundamental 
principles of its domestic law, such legislative and other measures as 
may be necessary to establish as criminal offences” concerning the 
 
62 Alliance Sud, et al, Swiss Responsibility for the Extraterritorial Impacts of Tax 
Abuse on Women’s Rights, Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women (Nov. 2016), at 9, https://www.cesr.org/sites/default/
files/switzerland_cedaw_submission_2nov2016.pdf. 
63 Id. 
64 FE Report, Bubble in Market Apprehended as Tk 100b Legalized in Six Months, FIN. 
EXPRESS (Bangl.), February 3, 2021, at Economy. 
65 Staff Correspondent, Whitening Black Money: Don’t Give the Scope Next Fiscal 
Year—Experts Urge Gov’t, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) February 3, 2021, at Back page. 
66 Bubble in Market Apprehended as Tk 100b Legalized in Six Months, supra note 64. 
67 Solaiman & Abu, supra note 61, at 47. 
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laundering of proceeds of crime to combat these crimes, while similar 
obligations are imposed on State parties to criminalize and prevent 
corruption under Articles 8–9. The whitening opportunities obviously 
encourage corruption and facilitate money laundering as alluded to 
earlier and will be further argued below.  Bangladesh ratified the 
UNCTOC on July 13, 2011.68 All these constitutional, statutory, and 
international obligations are deliberately avoided and flouted by an 
ordinary piece of financial legislation, the Finance Act, almost every 
year through amending the income tax law. 
It is generally presumed that good intentions underlie all laws 
made by State authorities. However, this presumption is rebuttable, 
and in a democratic setup, the judiciary is entitled to determine the 
validity of any law made by the legislature or executive authorities of 
the same jurisdiction. In doing so, a competent court can consider, 
among other things, whether the law is “so outrageous in its defiance 
of logic or of accepted moral standards that no sensible person who 
had applied his mind to the question could have arrived at it,” as was 
held by the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister 
for the Civil Service.69 
Likewise, in 1803, the Supreme Court of the United States in 
Marbury v. Madison pronounced that “[i]t is emphatically the province 
and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.”70 Scholar 
Anthony Okorodas spells out that “the intention of Parliament can 
only be determined by the courts by means of application of principles 
and rules of statutory interpretation.”71 And in the context of the 
legislative powers of the Parliament of Bangladesh, “[t]he constitution 
vests Parliament with the power to make laws for Bangladesh.” This 
 
68 United Nations Treaty Collection, United Nations Convention against Transnational 
Organized Crime https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mt
dsg_no=XVIII-12&chapter=18&clang=_en (last accessed on June 20, 2021). 
69 Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374, 
410 (Eng.). 
70 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803 
71 Anthony Ezonfade Okorodas, The Role of Section 2(1) and (4) of the European 
Communities Act and Section 3(1) of the Human Rights Act in the Interpretation and 
Application of Primary Legislation: Impact on Judicial Attitudes to the Traditional 
Concept of Parliamentary Sovereignty (Dec. 2008) (PhD thesis, on file with the 
University of Northumbria at Newcastle), https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/4148919
.pdf. 
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law-making power of Parliament is not unfettered but is subject to a 
condition of constitutionality. Thus, Parliament is not authorized to 
ascertain the constitutionality of its own acts. 
The judiciary is entrusted to determine the constitutionality of 
an act passed by Parliament.”72 Accordingly, Articles 7 and 102 of the 
Constitution jointly empower the Supreme Court of Bangladesh to 
review the validity of laws made by the Parliament because “any 
competent court of law, especially the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, 
is empowered and competent to judge whether a particular act of 
Parliament is consistent or not with the constitution.”73 In exercising 
this power, the Supreme Court of Bangladesh has nullified several 
pieces of legislation such as the Indemnity Ordinance of 1975 
(Bangladesh), which prohibited the trial of the killers of Bangabandhu 
Sheikh Mujibur Rahman74 and others in 1975,75 and the Constitution 
(Sixteenth Amendment) Act 2014 (Bangladesh) regarding removal of 
judges of the Supreme Court by Parliament.76 Therefore, if a legal 
challenge is launched with the Supreme Court of Bangladesh, it is 
likely that the Court will declare such amnesties invalid. 
II. RESPONSES OF BLACK MONEY HOLDERS TO GENERAL 
AMNESTIES AND THEIR IMPACTS ON THE ECONOMY 
A. Responses of Black Money Holders 
Even though only a small amount of black money is legalized, 
amnesties can permit BMHs to pay a nominal 10 percent tax, with or 
without paying the actual tax in higher rates, while honest taxpayers 
must pay up to 30 percent tax for individuals and 40 percent corporate 
 
72 Islam, supra note 35, at 326. 
73 Id. at 327. 
74 Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, Father of the Nation and the first President 
of Bangladesh, was assassinated on August 15, 1975, along with most of his family 
members and associates. See Sheikh Mujibur Rahman: Army officer hanged for 
murder of Bangladesh’s founding president, BBC NEWS (Apr. 12, 2020), https://www.
bbc.com/news/world-asia-52258557. 
75 Shariar Rashid Khan v. Bangladesh, (1997) 49 DLR (HCD) 133 (Bangl.). 
76 Idrisur Rahman v. Syed Shahidur Rahman, (2005) 7 SCOB (AD) (Bangl.); see also 
Rezaul Karim, Four could not even be traced, DAILY STAR (Bangl.) Aug. 14, 2016, at 
Back Page. 
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tax. Responses are inextricably connected with the definition of black 
money. There is no uniform definition of black money, and it is 
described in different terms by different laws and authorities. As 
defined by the NBR, black money refers to that which is earned legally 
or illegally but not declared to the relevant government agencies, and 
therefore no tax is paid thereon.77  Using “untaxed money” as a 
synonym for black money is not only erroneous but also a complete 
misrepresentation of its underlying concept as generally perceived. 
Commentators are critical of such a simplification of black money, 
which arguably waters down the seriousness of its inherent illegality 
by minimizing the difference between legally earned money and that 
which is criminally amassed through illegitimate means.78 
Commentators prefer reflecting the general perception of such money 
in its definition, focusing instead on the ways and means of 
accumulating it. This approach encompasses all potential offenses and 
morally degraded activities of different groups, including public 
servants, public and private organizations, private individuals, labor 
leaders, student leaders, and so on.79  From an academic point of view, 
a more acceptable perception of such money: 
[R]evolves around the concept of illegally obtained 
money through political and/or bureaucratic 
corruption, bribery at all levels of the government, 
semi-government, autonomous or semi-autonomous 
offices or organisations, money amassed by the 
businessmen through smuggling, black marketing, 
shady deals, profiteering, money amassed by labour 
leaders, student leaders, through extortions and, 
especially, money amassed by functionaries of the 
ruling government party and its various organs and 
their families, relatives and cronies.80 
The government may at times deliberately turn a blind eye to 
the fact that black money already exists in the formal economy in 
 
77 Waris & Latif, supra note 1, at 247. 
78 Id. 
79 See id. 
80 Id. 
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parallel with the underground economy. This can be easily observed 
when looking at the lifestyle and prosperities of BMHs. Expressing a 
similar view, some scholars state that such illicit “money circulates 
both in the formal economy and the parallel black economy, which 
tends to gain strength day by day at the cost of the formal economy, 
because black money naturally prefers activities relating to the black 
economy.”81Although successive governments since late 1975 have 
offered amnesties to BMHs, the public response was clearly 
insignificant because the amounts whitened and tax received so far are 
both small. Despite the government’s intention of setting deadlines, 
there are no punishments for BMHs who have not availed themselves 
of the opportunity. This is mainly because BMHs take for granted that 
the opportunity will continue for an indefinite period, and so they do 
not fear for the threat of punishment. 
Consequently, both corruption and money laundering are on 
the rise, which is evident in the recent relegation of Bangladesh by the 
Transparency International (TI) in its corruption perception index. 
According to the 2019–2020 Index report, Bangladesh has fallen to 12th 
from the earlier 14th position in the bottom among 180 countries in 
2018–2019.82As analysts comment, the larger amount of black money 
is siphoned off overseas, the less is saved as fixed deposits, and the rest 
is spent on maintaining a rich lifestyle by BMHs.83 Against this 
backdrop of abortive regulation of black money, the government 
offered unprecedented incentives to BMHs as a budgetary measure for 
the 2020–2021 fiscal year. To this effect, the Finance Minister’s 
pronouncement was exotically invading and overriding when he 
stated in his budget speech: 
Regardless of the provisions of any other prevailing 
law of the land, individual taxpayers will be allowed 
to disclose any type of undisclosed house property 
including land, building, flat, and apartment between 
 
81 Id. 
82 Helal Uddin Ahmed, Graft Ranking Goes Down, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Feb. 3, 
2021), http://thefinancialexpress.com.bd/public/views/graft-ranking-goes-down-1612
364403. 
83 Rejaul Karim Byron, Record Tk 10,220cr Black Money Legalized in Jul-Dec, DAILY 
STAR (Bangl.), Jan. 5, 2021, at Business. 
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July 1, 2020 and June 30, 2021 on paying tax at a 
particular rate on per square metre of the said asset. 
Individual taxpayers will also be able to make any 
disclosure of undisclosed cash, bank deposits, savings 
certificates (Sanchayapatra), shares, bonds or any other 
securities between 1st July 2020 and 30th June 2021 on 
paying taxes at a rate of 10 percent on the value of the 
said declaration; and no authority including the income 
tax authority can raise any question on such declarations 
[Italics added].84 
Despite the complete impunity for legalising black money, the 
response was lukewarm.85 The responses of BMHs are shown in the 




















in BDT Crore 
Total Tax & Penalty 
Taxes (where 
applied) Received 
in Million US$ 
(approx.) 
1971-1975 2.25 0.271 0.19 0.023 
1976-1980 50.76 6.116 0.81 0.098 
1981-1990 45 5.422 4.59 0.533 
1991-1996 150 18.072 15 1.807 
1997-2000 950 114.458 141 16.988 
2001-2007 827 99.639 102 12.289 
2007-2009 1,682 202.651 911 109.759 
2009-2013 1,805 217.470 230 27.711 
 
84 Helal Uddin Ahmed, Whitening Black Money, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Bangl.), Jan. 
13, 2021, at Views (emphasis added). 
85 Whitening Money, FINANCIAL EXPRESS (Bangl.), Feb. 5, 2021, at Editorial. 
86 Saddam Hossain Imran, Hidik to Show Hidden Money, JUGANTOR (Bangl.), Feb. 7, 
2021, at 1; Fazlur Rahman, Scope to Legalize Black Money Indefinitely: Kamal’s Plan 
Draws Flak from Economists, DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 21, 2021, at Business. 
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2013-2020 11,107 1,338.193 1,073 129.277 
2020-2021 
(Jul. 2020-








30,914  3,724.581 3,916.59 471.858 
 
Since Bangladesh’s independence in 1971, a total amount of 
BDT 30,914 crore (US $3,724,581) has been whitened by paying 
approximately BDT 3,916.59 crore (US $471,858,000) to the state coffer. 
The triviality of the amount whitened thus far can be compared with 
the GDP ratio. The GDP of Bangladesh was US $8.993 billion in 1970, 
which grew to US $324.239 billion in 2020.88 As per the country’s 
Ministry of Finance, the size of the underground economy is between 
41 and 82 percent of its GDP,89 whereas the total amount whitened 
over the past 50 years is only approximately US $3.724 billion. 
The above Table vividly portrays that BMHs remain largely 
unmoved by the frequent or regular declaration of amnesty for them. 
This is so because most of them reasonably believe that the cosmetic 
threats of punishment for nondisclosure or non-whitening of their 
assets will not be enforced, nor do they wait for such an opportunity 
to be declared every year, which has already been a repetitive and 
routine inclusion in the yearly budget. A brief answer to explain the 
poor response regarding such amnesties is that BMHs do not care 
about the threat of punishment as they have found no reason to fear. 
This assertion was affirmed in fiscal year 2007–2008 when the army-
backed non-party caretaker government was able to persuade BMHs 
to make disclosures, resulting in the legalization of the highest amount 
of ill-gotten money until June 2020, although the offer on that occasion 
was more conditional and less attractive compared to previous ones. 
 
87 The opportunity was much wider for FY2020–2021, so this amount (BDT14,295) 
includes the prices of the BMHs’ wealth shown in the form of cash, fixed deposit 
receipts, saving certificates and shares. Rahman, supra note 86. 
88 World Bank, GDP (current US$)—Bangladesh, https://data.worldbank.org/indica
tor/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=BD. 
89 Kibria, supra note 18; O’Neill, supra note 18. 
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The only reason for that historic response was exerting a credible 
threat to punish the BMHs after the expiry of the offer period. It is a 
matter of great regret that the Prime Minister of the immediate 
predecessor of this caretaker government herself whitened BDT 1.33 
crore (US $160,240) on August 6, 2007 by paying BDT 33.87 lac (US 
$40,807) as a penalty in addition to taxes.90 More reprehensibly, the 
immediate past Chief Justice of Bangladesh is currently facing trial for 
alleged corruption and money laundering.91 The record of fiscal year 
2007–2008 has been broken by the amount whitened in response to the 
blanket offer of amnesty for fiscal year 2020–2021, which can be 
attributed to two factors. First, the offer made through the Finance Act 
of 2020 (Bangladesh)92 is unprecedentedly generous in terms of its 
wider scope of investment, and no question could be asked about the 
source of money. Second, and perhaps more importantly, both 
national and international lockdowns triggered by Covid-19 
prevented BMHs from flying overseas with the money. The 
government is taking credit in such a success, forgetting these two 
extraordinary driving factors. In this regard, Professor Moinul Islam, 
a national award recipient economist, prudently explains that money 
laundering has also slowed down due to the pandemic, which has led 
to a big jump in the display of undisclosed funds in the current 
financial year. Once the pandemic is under control, capital smuggling 
will start in full swing again.93 
Although no one has ever shown any instances of attaining 
national economic prosperity by allowing BMHs to whiten their illicit 
possessions, the successive governments, in support of these 
amnesties, have always accentuated two points: achieving national 
economic development and preventing money laundering or capital 
flights. These are arguably poor excuses for the hidden, real reason—
the government’s failure in preventing corruption and money 
laundering. Whatever the actual reason, the impacts of such 
impunities are destructive as these contribute to increasing corruption, 
 
90 Khaleda “Whitened White Money,” DAILY STAR (Bangl.), May 11, 2010; Waris & 
Latif, supra note 1, at 248. 
91 Tipu, supra note 19. 
92 See the Finance Act of 2020 (Bangl.), §§ 16–19 in particular. 
93 See Moinul Islam, Stopping Capital Smuggling Requires Sincerity in Curbing 
Corruption, BONIK BARTA (Bangl.), June 16, 2021, at Editorial. 
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committing serious violent crimes, financing terrorism, punishing 
honest taxpayer, declining revenue in the long run, exposing the 
country’s shallow securities market to volatility, driving out honest 
income earners from the property market, widening the gap between 
the rich and the poor, and harming the nation. Discussions of some of 
these negative impacts ensue. 
B. Increase in Corruption 
There is a unanimous view that defining corruption by use of 
a single concept is a difficult task because it is “a complex and 
transversal phenomenon.”94 Corruption is defined as the “misuse of 
entrusted power or responsibility for any private benefit of self or 
others.”95 As articulated by the UN, “[c]orruption is an insidious 
plague that has a wide range of corrosive effects on societies. It 
undermines democracy and the rule of law, leads to violations of 
human rights, distorts markets, erodes the quality of life and allows 
organized crime, terrorism and other threats to human security to 
flourish.”96 Corruption has increased ominously in Bangladesh. Critics 
blame the government’s flawed policy of indemnifying the money 
launderers and heartening them by offering whitening opportunities, 
which contributes to increased corruption and serves as a stimulus for 
prospective wrongdoers.97 
Corruption is sometimes classified into two categories: petty 
and grand. The former refers to corrupt practices by low level 
government officials, while the latter denotes illegal activities of high 
level public servants and politicians committing such acts usually for 
larger amounts of money.98 Some scholars explain that grand 
corruption occurs at the highest levels of government “often at the 
behest or blessings of the powers” and that such treacherous conduct 
typically remain unchallenged, and wrongdoers are exonerated from 
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96 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Oct 31, 2003, 2349 U.N.T.S. 41. 
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potential legal sanctions.99 Grand corruption is particularly pervasive 
in that it is committed by high-ranking public officials who regard 
themselves above the reach of law, believing that they may freely 
engage in corrupt practices.100 This happens in violation of the concept 
of the supremacy of law, which is an integral element of the “rule of 
law.”101 Corruption is said to be intertwined with the supremacy of 
law because those who consider themselves above the law are likely to 
disobey it.102 Many scholars thus argue that “[i]t is very difficult for a 
nation to maintain the rule of law if its citizens do not respect the 
law.”103 
Petty corruption, though it typically involves small amounts of 
money, has substantial ramifications for the economy and the 
public.104 As many as 72 percent of the people in Bangladesh believe 
that government corruption is a big problem ultimately halting 
economic progress. In March 2021, the past Chairman of the ACC 
stated, “it is not worth our time denying that corruption in Bangladesh 
persists in a wider expanse.”105 The increase in corruption can be 
perhaps best reflected in the TI’s yearly reports of the Corruption 
Perception Index (CPI) on Bangladesh as cited earlier, which 
demonstrates an upward trend in corruption in Bangladesh. The TI 
uses a scale of 0 to 100 in determining the scores, meaning that 100 is 
the least corrupt and 0 is the most corrupt. Bangladesh’s score in the 
2020 CPI released on January 28, 2021, 2020 was significantly worse 
than the previous year.106 Further, its standing is deplorable not only 
in the global list but also in Asia. Amongst eight South Asian countries, 
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Bangladesh is ranked the second-most corrupt country defeating only 
war-torn Afghanistan; among all Asian countries, Bangladesh is 
ranked the fourth lowest, performing better than only Cambodia, 
Afghanistan, and North Korea 107 It is obvious that existing BMHs will 
continue to make such money, which will stimulate others to follow 
suit, if such a regulatory laxity persists. Instead of threatening to not 
extend further amnesty, the incumbent Finance Minister in a pre-
budget speech declared that the scope to legalize black money will 
remain in place indefinitely.108 Such an assurance can only instigate 
and inspire accumulation of black money, rather than any legalization 
thereof. This is what is happening in practice, which is adding miseries 
to the lives of honest taxpayers in different ways. One manifestation of 
this harm is the unaffordable housing market in Dhaka. 
C. Driving Out Honest Income Earners from the 
Property Market 
Housing is a problem in Dhaka because of unreasonably high 
prices, widely believed to be driven by black money. Over the past 15 
years, the prices of residential apartments located in different areas of 
Dhaka are displayed in the Figure below:109 
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The average price for land is even more frustrating as 
demonstrated by the Figure that follows. 110 
 
These unjustified upward trends in real estate prices 
effectively push honest buyers out of the market, which is exclusively 
dominated by BMHs. This is evident from the fact that, after the 
declaration of an excessively generous amnesty in June 2020, most of 
the ready-for-occupants flats in Dhaka had quickly been sold out at a 
higher price, and the real estate businesses are now experiencing rising 
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demands for apartments and flats.111 Around 2,000 flats were sold 
between November 2020 to January 2021, and reportedly for which at 
least BDT 5,000 crore (US $602.410 million) of black money came to the 
housing market.112 Intriguingly, the public servants are the dominant 
clients for those houses.113 Given the exorbitant property prices in the 
most popular suburbs of the capital city,  commentators argue that 
honest taxpayers will be compelled to rent from dishonest owners to 
survive, which will make the rich even richer at the cost of unfair and 
unjust suffering of honest people and their families.114 Money 
laundering is giving a further boost to corrupt practices. Expert 
scholars argue that a close nexus exists between corruption and money 
laundering because proceeds of corrupt activities can be cleaned up 
without any stigma of illegality, and laundering is one of the favorite 
means of doing it. This connection is termed an “incestuous 
relationship” between two evils.115 In quest of the truth in this 
construction, the following section depicts the money laundering 
scenario in Bangladesh. 
D. Increase in Money Laundering 
Money laundering, as defined by GFI, is “the process of 
disguising the proceeds of crime and integrating it into the legitimate 
financial system.”116 Money laundering denotes a process or a 
technique by which launderers clean up their “dirty money” 
accumulated from illicit activities to camouflage the origins of the 
money with the intention to make them appear to have derived from 
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lawful sources.117 The International Monetary Fund (IMF) defines it 
somewhat differently by describing that the commission of money 
laundering “requires an underlying, primary, profit-making crime—
such as corruption, drug trafficking, market manipulation, fraud, or 
tax evasion—along with the intent to conceal the proceeds of the crime 
or to further the criminal enterprise.”118 
Money laundering is on the rise in Bangladesh as revealed 
from the Basel AML Index 2020, which ranked it 38th among 141 
countries,119 recording a worsening move by seven places from its 
position in 2019.120 More alarmingly, as disclosed in the annual report 
of Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU), the number of 
reports on suspicious financial transactions and activities pertaining to 
money laundering has risen around 64 percent during the 2017–2018 
financial year compared to that of the preceding year.121  The BFIU 
annual report records that the total number of suspicious transaction 
report (STR) together with the suspicious activity report (SAR) was 
3,878 in fiscal year 2017–2018 as opposed to 2,357 reports in fiscal year 
2016–2017.122 Correspondingly, Global Financial Integrity (GFI)—a 
Washington-based think tank—provides an account of massive 
amounts of laundered money of BDT 530,000 crore (US $63.859 billion) 
from Bangladesh during 2005–2015, and it estimates that more than 
BDT 50,000 crore (US $6.024 billion) is being siphoned off every year 
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from the country.123 The Executive Director of TIB comments that a 
lack of “political will” is contributing to increasing money 
laundering.124 Criminals generally launder the proceeds of crime 
because they may have difficulties in using the money in a legitimate 
way as they are unable to explain the source of that money.  Once such 
proceeds are laundered, they become difficult to distinguish between 
the legally earned money and that wangled from illegitimate sources, 
thus criminals can use the money safely without detection.125 
Moreover, the host countries of the laundered money may not ask 
about sources at all. However, the main sources of the money 
laundered as underlined by the authorities in Bangladesh are 
corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking.126 
Money laundering can be committed by transferring the illicit 
money directly or by using trade invoices. Trade-based money 
laundering (TBML) is a popular means of committing this offense. The 
Asia-Pacific Group on Money Laundering defines TBML as being “the 
process of disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through 
the use of trade transactions in an attempt to legitimize their 
origins.”127  Misinvoicing is the prime tool used for committing TBML. 
The GFI identifies four primary reasons for trade misinvocing: (i) 
money laundering as the first and foremost reason for which criminal 
and corrupt officials hide their offenses generating the disputed 
money; (ii) evading tax and custom duties by underreporting the value 
of goods and services underlying the invoice; (iii) claiming tax 
incentives from the destination of laundered money as a number of 
countries offers lucrative tax benefits to local exporters taking 
advantage of which dishonest exporters tend to over-reporting their 
exports; and (iv) avoiding capital control as many countries put 
restrictions on incoming and outgoing amounts of capital. 128 
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Eventually, money laundering with respect to trade 
misinvoicing is certainly the falsification of trade documents to 
masquerade the punishable truth underlying the transaction, and to 
enable the counterpart international trader to ostensibly legitimize the 
possession of the property shifted.129 Trade misinvoicing is a useful 
means on which launderers rely to commit the primary crime, and 
then they deliberately hide the illegality attached to the laundered 
property through a series of subsequent transactions.130 Adebayo 
Iyanda argues that the motivations of trade misinvoicing should be 
considered “predicate offenses to enable prosecutors to bring 
additional charges of money laundering against the fraudulent 
operations of commercial businesses.” 131 Iyanda adds that money 
laundering is illegal because somewhere at the origin, movement or 
use of the money underlying a given transaction broke laws.132 The 
offense of money laundering is constituted as soon as the true nature 
of the transfer of funds from one country to another is concealed and 
the assets transferred are proceeds of a crime.133 The true nature of ill-
gotten property obscured in a bid to make it seem licit.134  As 
recognised by the European Union (EU), the proceeds can be of any 
types of property encompassing: 
…that which has been transformed or converted, fully or in 
part, into other property, and that which has been intermingled with 
property acquired from legitimate sources, up to the assessed value of 
the intermingled proceeds. It can also include the income or other 
benefits derived from proceeds of crime, or from property into or with 
which such proceeds have been transformed, converted or 
intermingled.135 
The illegal practice of misinvoicing misrepresents the price or 
quantity of imports or exports by accumulating money in foreign 
jurisdictions to participate in tax evasion, avoid customs duties, and 
 
129 Adebayo E. Iyanda, The Role of Misinvoicing in the Money Laundering Cycle, 3 J. 
ANTI-CORRUPTION LAW 144, 168 (2019). 
130 Id. at 158. 
131 Id. at 161. 
132 Id. at 150. 
133 Id. at 153-54. 
134 Id. at 157-58. 
135
 DIRECTIVE 2014/42 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL, 
Paragraph 11 of the Preamble, 2021 O.J. (L 127) 39. 
2021 FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY 75 
transfer illicit money.136 This ill-practice is executed by manipulating 
the customs invoices or other incoming customs documents, such as 
receipts, bills of lading, bills of sale, titles, and export certificates.137 
Apart from professional traders, criminals also make use of 
misinvoicing to launder the proceeds of their crimes.138 Regardless of 
the actual motivation, the process of misinvoicing embroils money 
laundering in that illegal activities are disguised by layers of 
transactions engineered to make property appear legitimate.139  These 
narratives correspond to the traditional theory of a money laundering 
scheme, which essentially necessitate the existence of prohibited 
profits preceding the perpetration of money laundering.140 
In Bangladesh, the description of money laundering provided 
in s2(v) of the MLPA 2012 conforms to the definitions elucidated 
above. Also, trade misinvoicing is a critical concern in Bangladesh 
because 80 percent of the total amount of money laundering is 
committed in the manner reminiscent of international trades.141 
Bangladesh does have money laundering legislation in place since 
2002. Nonetheless, a huge amount of money is siphoned off to foreign 
destinations every year mainly because of a lack of enforcement of the 
law. The finance minister recently stated that the government will 
amend the law to identify money launderers,142 although many of the 
known launderers remain untouched.143 The ACC is in operation 
alongside AML and anti-corruption laws, but the watchdog has failed 
to act fruitfully to meet people’s expectation, as admitted by its 
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erstwhile Chairman. The extent of TBML from Bangladesh can be 
evidenced by the GFI Report below. 144 
 
A study of GFI titled “Illicit Financial Flows to and from 148 
Developing Countries: 2006-2015,” released in January 2019, 
uncovered that around US $5.9 billion was laundered from 
Bangladesh in 2015 through trade misinvoicing.145 The GFI added that 
a total of US $81.74 billion has been laundered over a period of 11 years 
starting in 2005.146 These figures confirm an upward trend in such 
proscribed transactions when compared with the 2017 report of GFI.147 
The foregoing shows the link between corruption and money 
laundering in that money laundering increased with the escalation in 
corruption. Experts spell out that “corruption embracing collusion, 
conflict of interest, and money laundering may remain hidden from 
the eyes of the common people who do not perceive or experience its 
immediate impact, but their ramifications run through the body-
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politic.”148 Money laundering is directly related to depositing money 
in overseas accounts in some instances. Swiss banks are a popular 
destination to that end. 
E. Increase in Deposits by Bangladeshis in Swiss Banks 
Many Bangladeshis deposit their black money in Swiss banks. 
These deposited figures are noteworthy, as demonstrated in the Table 
below covering from 2004 to 2019.149 
 
Year Deposited in Crore of BDT Deposited in Millions 
of US$ (approx.)  
US $ @BDT83 
2004 365 US$43.976 
2005 863 US$103.976 
2006 1,106 US$133.253 
2007 2,187 US$263.494 
2008 952 US$114.699 
2009 1,326 US$159.760 
2010 2,100 US$253.012 
2011 1,355 US$163.253 
2012 2,038 US$245.542 
2013 3,311 US$398.516 
2014 4,539 US$546.867 
2015 4,977 US$599.639 
2016 5,883 US$708.795 
2017 4,288 US$516.627 
2018 5,498 US$662.410 
2019 5,367 US$646.627 
2020 5,203 US$626.867 
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The amounts of money flying from Bangladesh to Swiss banks 
recorded in the above Table show mostly an upward trend, and all 
figures individually are very large, given the size of the country’s 
economy. The amount sent out in 2008 reconfirms that the “fear-
factor” works, as evidenced by the highest amount whitened and the 
lowest amount, since 2006, deposited in Swiss banks. However, the 
amounts deposited in 2020 are slightly low due to the worldwide 
pandemic lockdown during which an increased amount was whitened 
locally. 
The money laundered or deposited in Swiss banks is primarily 
generated by offensive conduct, which includes “looting” public 
deposits from local banks under the guise of loans by influential 
borrowers. A recent US study on the effects of local public corruption 
on lending finds that such “corruption exerts a negative and 
significant effect on lending in the US.”150 Corruption does reduce 
transparency and performance of firms.151 The section that ensues 
focuses on the black money accumulated through borrowing from 
banks in Bangladesh, leaving several financial institutions in a 
critically unsustainable condition owing large amounts of defaulted 
loans. 
F. Increase in Defaulted Loans 
Capital flights and defaulted loans are inseparably connected 
to each other in the context of Bangladesh.152 The current government 
deserves much appreciation for notable successes in several sectors, 
which have been overshadowed by the manifested failure in the 
banking sector. A few people have miserably “looted” almost all state-
owned banks in the country. The situation is that money goes out from 
banks but does not come back, let alone receiving interests on those 
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loans. The government has kept those banks running by feeding 
stimulus from taxpayers’ money as life-saving injections. The sum of 
the defaulted loans in the banking sector has increased by 417 percent 
against a 312 percent increase in the amount of credit during 2009-
2019.153 A lawmaker, raising this issue in Parliament, stated that 
directors are taking money from banks, laundering millions of BDT, 
and also sending money abroad through hundi, which contributes to 
the awfully high amounts of defaulted loans.154 TIB blames central 
bank failure, political interference, and the influence of businesspeople 
on the vulnerability of financial institutions.155 The gradual rise of the 
defaulted loans are portrayed below.156 
 
The exponential surge in defaulted loans occurred in 
Bangladesh at a time when such loans are decreasing in other Asian 
countries, as shown below.157 
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Country Rates of 
Defaulted Loans 
in Percent 
Country Rates of 
Defaulted Loans 
in Percent 
Bangladesh 11.87 China 1.8 
India 9.3 Nepal 1.7 
Pakistan 8.2 Malaysia 1.5 
Sri Lanka 3.4 Singapore 1.3 
Thailand 3 Japan 1.1 
Indonesia 2.5 South 
Korea 
0.7 
Philippines 2.1 Hong 
Kong 
0.5 
Vietnam 1.9 Taiwan 0.2 
 
Bad loans continue to escalate further. As per the central bank 
data, the total defaulted loans jumped to BDT 95,085 crore (US $11.456 
billion) as of March 31, 2021 from BDT 88,283 crore (US $11.035 billion) 
as of December 31, 2020.158 Expressing frustration regarding this 
increase, Dr AB Mirza Azizul Islam, a high profile economist, 
comments that the surge of toxic loans is so high even after 
underreporting, and adds that the deterioration can be attributed to 
the fact that “the defaulters have been awarded with policy support 
one after another . . . When the defaulters are provided with so many 
scopes to remain as regular borrowers without making payments, why 
would they repay their loans?”159 The executive director of the 
country’s Policy Research Institute opined that the reason for such an 
increase in the first quarter of 2021 is “the expiry of the regulatory 
embargo on downgrading loans in December 2020, however, he also 
predicted that such loans are set to increase even further in the coming 
months.”160 Almost all critiques point towards the undue incentives 
offered to the defaulters, one of which is waiving interests instead of 
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confiscating their assets.161 An account of such waivers by eight state-
owned commercial and specialized banks shows that they alone have 
waived BDT 3,203 crore (US $386 million) over a period of five years 
ending in 2016.162  Showing even more generosity to the loan 
defaulters, the amount of waived interests was BDT 3,400 crore (US 
$409.6 million) for the subsequent two years (2017-2018). 163 
A culture of loan defaults has developed over the years mainly 
because of government favors for these wrongdoers.164 It can be 
reasonably believed that these undue favors have contributed to the 
erosion of public confidence in the governance system.165 The 
government is so sympathetic to defaulters that the central bank issues 
a circular by allowing them to get their credit rescheduled at low 
interest rates as well as offering new loans to the defaulters. The 
circular was legally challenged, and the Supreme Court of Bangladesh 
(HCD)166  halted that the circular to grant new loans to the defaulters 
and observed that “giving such privilege to loan defaulters is 
tantamount to feeding snakes with milk and banana” and that the 
circular creates scope of laundering BDT 100,000 crore (US $12.048 
billion).167 The Court further adds that the central bank is 
discriminatorily making genuine businesspeople pay 14 to 15 percent 
interest.168 Notably, thousands of crores of borrowed money are being 
laundered and defaulters are hiding overseas,169 and most of these 
defaulters are reported to be laundering borrowed money with the 
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help of directors appointed on political consideration and top 
executives of state-owned banks.170 A former deputy governor of 
Bangladesh Bank remarked that “[d]efaulted loans are rising as the 
government and the central bank are persistently encouraging 
defaulters,” and added that such an encouragement is unprecedented 
in the world other than Bangladesh.171 This is happening in a situation 
where almost all of the state-owned banks are suffering from 
minimum capital shortfalls.172 Banks are supposed to maintain 10 
percent capital against their risk weighted assets, and in accordance 
with s13(7) of the Bank Company Act 1991 (Bangladesh), such a 
shortfall in capital is punishable, though no punitive action has been 
noticed thus far.173  Hence, an inference can be plausibly drawn that 
corruption and money laundering are contributing to the ruination of 
state-owned financial institutions. The black money is also being used 
to purchase second homes in other countries. 
G. Increase in Capital Flights and Buying Second Home 
Overseas 
Many Bangladeshis buy their second homes overseas, but 
where does the money for such purchases come from? The NBR 
Chairman in 2019 disclosed that less than one-third of potentially 
eligible taxpayers pay taxes.174 The immediate past Chairman of the 
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ACC termed this “a shame of the nation.”175 Only one percent of 
people pay tax, and Bangladesh also lags far behind the neighboring 
countries in terms of tax-GDP ratios.176 According to the World Bank, 
Nepal has the highest tax-GDP ratio in South Asia at about 19 percent, 
followed by Bhutan 16 percent, India 12 percent, Sri Lanka 11.6 
percent, Pakistan 11 percent, Afghanistan 9.9 percent and the Maldives 
9.1 percent. 177 Unfortunately, the tax-GDP ratio in Bangladesh is only 
8 percent which has dropped to 7 percent due to Covid-19, pushing 
the country to the situation of 14 years back.178 
In such a tax-payment scenario, many Bangladeshis are 
paradoxically making their second homes in Asia-Pacific countries.179 
Their list includes corrupt government officials, politicians, bank-
insurance owners, middle-tier businessmen and construction 
contractors.180 Though far behind others in terms of paying taxes, 
Bangladesh ranked third amongst all the countries participating in the 
“Malaysia My Second Home (MM2H)” project till 2016.181 A total of 
4,135 Bangladeshis have taken part in the MM2H project. That number 
falls after Chinese and British citizens’ purchase of Malaysian 
homes.182 Perhaps more strangely, Bangladeshis have developed a 
posh suburb in Toronto, called “Begum Para” (Wives’ Suburb), a place 
where the residents are dominantly wives (Begum), and ‘Para’ means 
Suburb.183 Wives and children of many Bangladeshi millionaires live 
in luxurious houses there, and their husbands stay in Bangladesh for 
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work until retirement. The expatriate Bangladeshis of Toronto 
protested alleged money launderers demanding legal actions against 
them.184 
As disclosed by the current Foreign Minister of Bangladesh, 
based on the government’s secret information, “most of the houses 
there have been purchased by government officials.” Some are retired 
Bangladeshi government officials, while others are serving officials, 
and those officials have surpassed politicians in buying houses 
there.185 Incredibly, one of those officials, Prashanta Kumar Halder 
alias PK Halder, has misappropriated at least BDT 10,200 crore (US 
$10229 billion) from four non-banking financial institutions and has 
purchased properties and opened a business in Canada.186 
Interestingly, the Finance Minister does not have the list of money 
launderers although he recently asked Parliament opposition 
lawmakers for it.187 The Supreme Court of Bangladesh (HCD) has 
asked for a full list of individuals who have bought homes abroad, but 
the ACC failed to provide such list.188 It is widely believed that the 
government is reluctant to disclose the identities of such individuals 
in anticipation of political repercussion. 
The foregoing discussions demonstrate that black money, even 
if whitened, goes mostly to unproductive sectors (e.g., housing, a small 
amount in share market, money laundering), which does not 
contribute to new employment opportunities. Instead, it causes 
securities market bubbles, which erode public confidence in the 
market and force investors to stay away from the market.189 Therefore, 
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the government’s claim to justify such amnesties is unfounded.190 The 
truth is that black money normally circulates in both the formal 
economy and the underground economy,191 which is evident in the 
activities of BMHs. One can hardly find economic development by 
offering amnesty in favor of BMHs. Rather, such action stimulates both 
honest and dishonest people alike to be corrupt. Hence, it is a “very 
bad system” as observed by Professor Muinul Islam, a well-known 
economist in Bangladesh.192  Consistently, Zahid Hussain, a former 
lead economist of the World Bank’s Dhaka office, admits that the 
government may be able to collect some revenues and get the amount 
invested in the short term by offering whitening opportunities.193 He 
however asserts that the continuation of this offer for years will 
eventually reduce the revenue by discouraging honest taxpayers, and 
therefore he adds that such a practice is “not only unfair to honest 
taxpayers but also harmful for tax revenue mobilization and 
investment efficiency in the long run.”194 
Despite such logical arguments, the Finance Minister has 
recently declared that the amnesty will remain in place as long as black 
money exits.195 Several leading economists have immediately 
lambasted such a blanket immunity and an advance license to both 
present and future BMHs, breaking the hearts of honest taxpayers.196 
These economists further add that “[w]e have lost at least twice the 
amount we have collected” and warned that it will lead to a collapse 
of the tax administration.197 Some other businesspersons, economists, 
and activists have demanded discontinuation of the facility by arguing 
that  “it goes against the spirit of tax justice, integrity, fairness and the 
constitution,” and further add that “[s]uch an indemnity discourages 
honest taxpayers from paying tax while it rewards taxpayers who 
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evade tax.”198 Another distinguished economist and a member of the 
United Nations Committee for Development Policy, Dr Debapriya 
Bhattacharya, said that the whitening opportunities have diluted “the 
gravity of offenses that are being committed to evade tax or to have ill-
gotten gains,”199 while a former Chairman of the NBR stipulates that it 
debilitates the government’s right to collect taxes from its taxpayers.200 
Hence, it is obvious that the indemnity should be 
discontinued, and the flow of black money must be controlled in the 
interest of the country. The generation of black money can only be 
stopped, at least to a large extent, by preventing commission of both 
the original crimes creating this money (e.g., corruption) and predicate 
crimes committed to utilizing the money (e.g., money laundering). 
Although Bangladesh has implemented some initiatives to halt the 
spread of black money, such initiatives are many times implemented 
unfairly. The discussions that follow explore certain measures that can 
be undertaken to effectively address the black money problem in 
Bangladesh and abroad. 
III. MEASURES MUST BE TAKEN TO PREVENT THE EXPLOITATION 
OF BLACK MONEY 
A. Checking Corruption 
A major source of black money is corruption, which is a 
‘ubiquitous and deeply rooted’ problem in Bangladesh.201 The extent 
of such a problem can be depicted by a recent interaction between a 
police officer and a judge’s wife. In this scenario, a police officer went 
to the home of one of Bangladesh’s Supreme Court justices to verify 
the passports of two of the judge’s daughters. The police officer 
requested a bribe of BDT 2000 (US $24.10) from the judge’s wife. 
Subsequently, the officer was sued for offensive criminal conduct.202 
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Studies have shown that at least 65 percent of urban people and 68 
percent of rural people have experienced the need to partake in bribery 
when seeking services from public authorities.203 
Amid the difficulty in separating white and black money, 
institutions engaged in the prevention of corruption should be 
established, however, Bangladesh lacks the resources to develop such 
programs, ultimately resulting in the existence of inexorable black 
money.204 Essentially, to control corruption, the government must 
require the creation of a strong anti-corruption regime tasked with 
protecting society from “this plague.”205 Within this concept, no anti-
corruption agency will be effective at combatting this evil without the 
government’s good governance, openness, and overall 
transparency.206 In fact, both transparency and openness are believed 
to discourage individuals from indulging in corrupt activities.207 More 
importantly, transparency and openness can strengthen “appropriate 
mechanisms of punishment within the legal, administrative, and 
electoral fields.” 208 Above all, the most important requisite needed to 
combat corruption is the political will of the government. In a 
comparative analysis of five Asian countries, Professor Quah found 
that the success of Singapore’s Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau 
can be attributed to the political will and conducive policies of the 
national government.209 Consistently, Mbaku suggested four 
requirements to control the spread of corruption: 210 (1) the State 
should inhibit public servants from engaging in corrupt activities and 
preclude them from working with impunity; (2) the State must have 
institutions, such as an independent press, that will act responsibly to 
assist enforcement agencies in the gathering of evidence against 
unlawful actors; (3) the judiciary must be an be independent and non-
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corrupt body of government; and (4) the State must guarantee its 
citizens open and transparent communication to enable the people to 
serve as a check on the exercise of goof governance.211 Mbaku adds 
that Northern European countries as well as the US and Canada have 
followed these four measures in dealing with corruption 
successfully.212 His four points are worthy of consideration with 
respect to the extent of corruption in Bangladesh in strengthening its 
anti-corruption institutions. 
B. Empowering the Anti-Corruption Commission 
The ACC is popularly known as the “toothless tiger”213 
because of its manifestly limited success in fighting corruption within 
the borders of Bangladesh. The ACC was formed in 2004 
under the ACCA 2004 to comply with “isomorphic pressure” from 
donors; thus, it has created a “mimicry movement.”214 Policymakers in 
Bangladesh conceded to donors’ pressure and brought about cosmetic 
legal reforms without any genuine commitment to implement them.215 
This became evident when the ACC’s independence became limited 
through an amendment to the ACCA 2004 in 2013,216 which required 
government approval for prosecuting public officials for alleged 
corruption. The Anti-Corruption Commission Act 2013 (Bangladesh) 
inserted section 32A into the ACCA 2004 requiring the ACC to obtain 
prior government “sanction” without which “no Court shall take 
cognizance of” corruption cases against those officials.217 The then-
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acting Chairman of the ACC reacted by stating that “[a]n unholy 
alliance has been instrumental in making the bill into a law.”218 The 
amendment relied upon concepts incorporated into the colonial 
legislation of 1898, which is irreconcilable with 21st century rule of law 
and inimical to the government’s declaration of ‘zero tolerance against 
corruption.”219 Therefore, in the interest of justice, the amendment 
should be repealed. 
When an evil is deeply rooted, watchdogs must have long 
teeth to dig deep because a weak institution cannot succeed at hunting 
down corrupt people in an exceedingly corrupt environment. The 
culture of impunity and the drive against corruption cannot go 
together. As observed by the head of TIB, the ACC does have useful 
mandates to prevent and prosecute corruption, however, it needs to 
have the adequate capability, skills, and expertise to enhance its 
operations; not to mention that its honesty and integrity must be 
impeccable.220 The functional weaknesses of the ACC are recognized 
widely, except for those whose views are politically or otherwise 
influenced.  Hence, overhaul is needed to make the watchdog effective 
in its statutorily mandated roles. 
A scholarly assessment of the ACC, based on empirical data in 
a TIB sponsored study, revealed that the watchdog needs to improve 
its performance. Its main challenges are winning people’s trust and 
confidence as well as overcoming several of its weaknesses.221 The 
study found that the ACC enjoys a low level of public confidence and 
negative perception on its effectiveness.222  To begin with, all 
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recruitments for the ACC should be impartial, fair, and transparent. 
This will generate greater public confidence in the watchdog. 
Woefully, the ACC’s activities are not immune from allegations of 
corruption and irregularities, which need to be addressed first. 
Individuals who are entrusted with the responsibility to fight against 
corruption many times become quickly engulfed by the evil.223  
Metaphorically, they must arrive at the job with clean hands. The evil 
thorns should be picked up with a needle, however, if the needle itself 
is blunt then the thorns cannot be removed. In this regard, a former 
ACC senior official in 2016 disclosed the following in an interview: 
According to my knowledge, only 2% of people in the 
commission are very wicked. You cannot make them 
good. And 2–3% of the people are sincere. You could 
not make them bad even if you wanted to. The rest of 
the people sail in the direction of the wind. Overall if 
the people of the top positions are corrupt, then all will 
be directed in that direction. Again, if they are decent, 
then others will be directed to goodness….224 
The ACC’s internal promotions of officials are alleged to be 
sold by ignoring merits.225  The regulator has earned the reputation of 
being “an ‘indemnity commission’ in recent times because of such 
questionable actions,” and there are allegations of government 
interference as well.226 The predominant obstacle to its success is 
probably the lack of “political will” coming from the government. The 
credibility crisis also exists with respect to its operational impartiality. 
It is imperative for the ACC to overcome the prevailing public 
perception that it is a government body appointed to protect the 
government’s political allies and punish its opponents.227 The 
watchdog itself has seemingly erected an invisible fence “beyond 
which it is unsure, unable, reluctant, or fearful of going, depending on 
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the identity, status or linkages of the individuals concerned.”228 
Firming this view, the Executive Director of the TIB asserts that the 
ACC “must break out of the dividing line it seems to have drawn for 
itself which prevents it from going beyond the small fries and bringing 
to justice the big fish, irrespective of their identity, status, and political 
or other linkages.”229 It is widely believed that the ACC suffers from a 
considerable lack of neutrality as it is directly or indirectly influenced 
by political interference.230 North underscores the need for an efficient 
legal system corresponding to a conducive institutional environment 
in which the anti-corruption institutions must have the capability to 
defuse corruption.231 To succeed in the fight against corruption, the 
ACC must stay above personal, political, and operational impartiality. 
232 It requires treating like cases alike without fear, favour, prejudice, 
anger, or bias. 233 
Addressing the credibility issue is important because holding 
a high level of public confidence is critical for a nation’s success. To 
this end, an empirical study on the ACC recommended implemented 
the following measures: 234 (1) effecting wider publicity of its activities 
to reach a greater number of people; (2) publicizing detailed 
statements regarding ACC officials’ income, assets, and liabilities on a 
regular basis; taking appropriate punitive actions against corrupt 
public representatives and high officials; and ensuring effective and 
timely investigation and expeditious trial of corruption cases.235  It is 
important to note that corruption cannot be combated by corrupt 
people. The ACC should therefore compel all its high officials, 
including commissioners and their family members, to make wealth 
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statements; to date, the ACC has never done this.236 The ACC is 
empowered to take internal measures against corrupt officials, but 
only a very few people have been punished thus far.237 Fairness and 
justice must be established first within the regulatory body. 
The ACC is a statutory body, and its chairman is appointed by 
the President of Bangladesh for five years based on the 
recommendation of a Search Committee headed by a senior judge of 
the Supreme Court of Bangladesh. ACC commissioners, including the 
Chairman, can be removed by the Supreme Judicial Council on the 
same grounds, and in accordance with the same procedures, as applies 
to the removal of judges of the highest court.238 Hence, the 
commissions are well protected from any forceful and undue removal. 
As assessed by the TIB, the ACC’s legal independence score of 78.57% 
was found to be the highest relating to legal independence, mandate, 
legal powers and the commissioners’ terms of office and removal 
provisions.239 Independence and impartiality are substantially assured 
under subsections 3(2)-(3) of the ACCA 2004, and section 24 further 
guarantees its operational freedom though it remains financially 
dependent on the government under section 25 of the ACCA 2004. 
Theoretically, the ACC has no accountability to any authority other 
than the Office of the Comptroller and Auditor General for reviewing 
its financial operations, as stated in section 6(3) of the ACCA2004.240 
All this sounds positive in theory, however, in practice, the 
independence and impartiality of its operations are not unassailable. 
Experts view that its independence is more contingent upon 
the personal capacity of office bearers rather than the provisions of law 
in the book.241 Also, the appointments of commissioners are conducted 
through a fair process even though there have been some allegations 
political considerations and lack of transparency.242 Therefore, the 
upholding of political loyalties cannot be ruled out given the 
selectivity in certain prosecutions as explained with reference to 
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specific case studies in a research sponsored by the TIB.243  Further, the 
ACC has to face bureaucratic procedures and may experience 
difficulties in obtaining essential documents and cooperation from 
authorities such as banks and the NBR.244 Such a lack of cooperation is 
hostile to smooth functioning of the ACC. The ACC’s accountability to 
an independent authority must be ensured to facilitate its impartial 
operations. To do so, it must overcome its frailty and uphold the spirit 
of independence and neutrality. 
C. Introducing Whistle-blower Rewards 
Whistleblowing occurs when an employee discloses acts of 
wrongdoing committed by his or her colleagues to public authorities; 
conventionally, whistleblowing was seen to be an act of personal 
choice rather than one of obligation. As articulated by the UN 
Coalition, an act of whistleblowing exists when a person reports “on 
the illegal or immoral activities of an individual or organization.” 245 
Whistle-blowers refer to those persons who, at their own peril, are 
“motivated by a sense of personal, and/or public duty, may expose 
what they perceive as specific instances of wrongdoing, which may be 
within the private and/or public sector.”246 
Whistle-blowers often risk being disciplined or dismissed from 
their position as they pose a threat to individuals committing 
wrongdoings within an organization.247 More importantly, 
whistleblowing is regard as “one of the most effective ways of 
exposing, fighting and remedying corruption . . . they are essential for 
revealing wrongdoing and protecting the public interest.”248 A study 
focused on economic crimes revealed that whistle-blowers out 
performed professional auditors in detecting frauds on private 
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corporations as the former were able to detect 43 percent of frauds 
while the latter was successful only 19 percent of the time.249  
Moreover, it evidences that “whistle-blowers are the single most 
effective source of information in detecting financial fraud.”250 
Arguing for whistle-blowers, Morehead asserts that whistleblowing is 
a “proven effective tool” to help detect wrongdoing earlier with less 
harm for the organizations, hence there is little reason not to make use 
of it. 251 Dworkin and Schipani reinforce the benefit of using whistle-
blowers by stating that “[t]he fact remains that encouraging 
whistleblowing is an effective tool of transparency which has proven 
helpful in the US in fighting financial crime.”252  Pahis underscored the 
need for offering incentives to insiders to sharpen anti-corruption 
drive in a corruption-prone country.253 
This strategy is important because detecting corruption is 
generally difficult as the offense is usually committed secretly. It is 
generally accepted that whistle-blowers can play a powerful role in 
challenging corruption and transnational crimes. The need for whistle-
blowers has increased in commensurate with the globalization and 
technological developments.  Within this realm, Avi-Yonah viewed, 
“capital is much more mobile than labor” in the era of globalization.254 
Globalization has increased integration of markets and the 
technological developments have facilitated methods of instantaneous 
communications and financial transactions, which apply to both legal 
and illegal dealings.255 These transactions are simple to execute but 
complex to guard against, resulting in significant weakening in the 
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regulatory ability to enforce rules against illegal contracts, which is 
evident especially in the cases of tax evasion and money laundering.256 
Hence, stimulating the act of whistleblowing becomes a 
veritable means of combating corruption.257 Whistleblowing, however, 
is a risky task in that the employer may take retaliatory measures 
against the whistle-blower for breaching common law duties of trust, 
loyalty, and confidence, which may lead to the dismissal of the 
whistle-blower from his or her position of employment.258 There are 
some common law principles to protect whistle-blowers from 
dismissal based on the “public interest theory,” which was developed 
out of the “inequity rule” as an exception to the duty of trust, loyalty, 
and confidence.259 Vice-Chancellor Wood articulated the theory in 
Gartside v. Outram in 1856: 
The true doctrine is, that there is no confidence as to 
the disclosure of iniquity. You cannot make me a 
confident of a crime or a fraud, and be entitled to close 
my lips upon any secret which you have the audacity 
to disclose to me relating to any fraudulent intention 
on your part: such a confidence cannot exist.260 
The doctrine is time honoured as the UK Court of Appeal in 
Initial Services Ltd v. Putterill consistently held that although an 
employee was under a duty not to disclose, information received in 
confidence in the course of his employment was subject to exceptions 
where the disclosure was justified in the public interest as in the cases 
of crime or fraud.261 The Court added, referring to the information 
relevant to the case in particular, that “the information was such as in 
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the public interest was not clothed with the protection afforded by law 
to confidence[.]” 262 Lord Denning in Initial Services Ltd v Putterill263 
stated that “[t]he exception should extend to crimes, frauds and 
misdeeds, both those actually committed as well as those in 
contemplation, provided always—and this is essential—that the 
disclosure is justified in the public interest.”264 His Honour further 
resonated that “no private obligations can dispense with that universal 
one which lies on every member of the society to discover every design 
which may be formed, contrary to the laws of the society, to destroy 
the public welfare.”265 
The above information firmly establishes whistle-blowers’ 
protection in Bangladesh as per the common law.266 Yet this is not to 
diminish the importance of ensuring the protection of whistle-blowers 
through statutory law. Appreciably, Bangladesh has already done so 
in 2011 through the Public Interest Information Disclosure Act of 2011, 
popularly known as the Whistleblower Protection Act 2011 (WBPA 
2011). However, as reported in late May 2021, most public servants, 
right activists, lawyers, and even journalists remain ignorant of the 
enactment of such legislation.267 More startlingly, a deputy director of 
the ACC), confirmed that they have received allegations of breach of 
the WBPA 2011, but they have not lodged any case thereunder.268A 
review of the WBPA 2011 suggests that the it is well drafted to protect 
whistle-blowers including, amongst others, officials in the public and 
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cases, departmental proceedings, or any kind of action, punishment, 
discrimination, any measure prejudicial to financial, mental or social 
reputation, prohibition of demotion, transfer for harassment, and 
forced retirement or discriminatory treatment by employer to an 
employee.269 Its section 9(1) imposes significant punishment for any 
contravention of the legislation, which may extend to imprisonment 
for a minimum term of two years, but not exceeding five years, or with 
fine or with both. 270 Further, section 9(2) provides that if the violator 
of the WBPA 2011 is a government employee, departmental actions 
shall have to be taken in addition to the punishment mentioned in 
section 9(1).271 Section 3 contains an overriding provision confirming 
that the WBPA 2011 shall apply even if any other existing laws 
contradict. 272 Moreover, section 14 provides that if the allegations 
brought under the WBPA 2011 are proved on the basis of the 
information provided by a whistle-blower, the appropriate authority 
may award adequate rewards to him or her. 273 
Admittedly, the text of the WBPA 2011 has been carefully 
drafted upholding the true spirit of whistle-blowers protection and 
combating corruption, but its benefit has never been enjoyed by 
anyone though enacted a decade ago. Hence, all that is now needed is 
to organize its extensive publicity and strict enforcement. Supporting 
whistle-blower cautiousness, Fisher observes that “whistleblowing is 
not always unselfish and its revelations are not always accurate. As 
with other informants, the whistle-blower’s motives may be selfish or 
evil as well, and the information provided may be false or 
incomplete.”274 It is not unlikely that some whistle-blowers may act 
maliciously to obtain a reward or work towards punishing others.275 
For a fruitful whistle-blower regime, an arrangement of concrete 
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incentives is warranted, as different from the imprecise hope for 
reward under the WBPA 2011. 
D. Stipulating Whistle-blower Incentives 
An effective whistle-blower incentive regime can be 
instrumental to avoid resource-constrained disadvantage of regulators 
in obtaining critical information in a cost-effective manner.276 As 
explained above, whistleblowing is a risky action for the blowers, their 
colleagues, and their employers. Nonetheless, some people agree to 
become whistle-blowers to participate in “whistle-blower reward 
programs” or “bounty regimes,” which provide financial benefits to 
witnesses that provide critical information that may aid in the 
conviction of offenders.277 The WBPA 2011 states that providing 
awards to whistle-blowers remains entirely at the discretion of 
“competent authority.” Not surprisingly, this provision does not 
incentivize many people to become whistle-blowers in Bangladesh 
where the practice is already not commonplace. 
The rewards may be in the form of cash payments or in kind 
by protecting whistle-blowers against retaliatory conduct by the 
employer. The prevention of retaliation is important as a recent study 
finds that 69 percent of whistle-blowers reported to have lost their jobs 
or been forced to retire while 64 percent reported to have been 
blacklisted by other employers in their respective fields after having 
received negative performance evaluations from their previous 
employers.278 Cash incentives are not yet common as only the United 
States has experimented with such rewards279 even though financial 
rewards were first introduced by the False Claims Act of 1863—also 
called the “Lincoln Law”—to combat corruption in the procurement 
of military supplies.280 Subsequently, in 1867, the Internal Revenue 
Services (IRS) pronounced a program of similar rewards with 
 
276 Id. at 82. 
277 Id. 
278 See Tanya M. Marcum et al., Blowing the Whistle in the Digital Age: Are You 
Really Anonymous? The Perils and Pitfalls of Anonymity in Whistleblowing Law, 17 
DEPAUL BUS. & COM. L.J. 1, 4 (2019) (footnote omitted). 
279 Nyreröd & Spagnolo, supra note 255, at 82. 
280 Id. 
2021 FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY 99 
incentives that were broadened under the Dodd–Frank Act of 2010281 for 
information on financial and securities frauds following the financial 
crisis triggered in 2007.282 The United States is a pioneer in the area of 
whistle-blower laws.283 This is true because American agencies believe 
that whistle-blower incentive programs are one of  the most powerful 
tools to protect the government from fraud.284 
Likewise, Canada introduced a whistle-blower reward 
program to address financial and securities frauds.285 Along these 
lines, tax whistle-blowers have also presented success in the United 
States.286 The Tax Court of the U.S. pronounced a rule on August 3, 
2016 stating “that tax whistle-blowers were entitled to a reward based 
on monies collected in criminal fines and penalties.”287 Some other 
countries—the United Kingdom, Hungary, and South Korea—have 
also implemented reward programs particularly for antitrust cartels.288 
Both South Korea and Canada have adopted laws similar to those in 
the United States and have achieved “tremendous success.”289 
E. Current Whistle-blower Reward Laws Around the 
World 
The National Whistleblower Center, an organization dedicated 
to the roles of whistle-blowers, noted that the best laws for such 
informers provide “a statutory guarantee” that such risk-takers will 
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receive a percentage of the pecuniary penalties recovered by 
prosecutors based on the disclosures at issue.290A 2021 empirical 
research argues in favor of whistle-blower rewards based on a simple 
cost-benefit analysis.291 Legislation providing whistle-blower 
protections continues to expand globally as evident in the enactment 
of such laws in at least 59 countries with varying success.292 The levels 
of success vary as many laws are still deficient in supporting effective 
whistleblowing, which warrants harmonization of laws by 
incorporating all vital features of successful whistleblowing 
regimes.293 There are four key critical elements of the most successful 
whistle-blower laws. First, legal provisions should allow whistle-
blowers to remain anonymous and keep their identities confidential 
while disclosing information on wrongdoings to the relevant 
authorities. This will help protect them from unfair retaliation by their 
colleagues or employers.294 Second, a strategy offering both carrot and 
stick would work better to prevent irregularities. Carrots will induce 
insiders to disclose irregularities despite the well-known legal 
sanctions associated with wrongdoing. To this end, public declarations 
of financial rewards for whistle-blowers contingent on the successful 
outcome of prosecution is critical. 295  Third, whistle-blowers generally 
have concerns about reprisals. Thus, remedies should be guaranteed 
in anticipation of retaliatory measures. Employers or colleagues often 
take reactive punitive actions to discredit or otherwise punish whistle-
blowers. To discourage these retaliatory actions, the best whistle-
blower laws provide for a range of remedies: repaying the wages and 
benefits lost due to unlawful termination and providing compensatory 
damages to cover the time needed to find a new job, including out of 
pocket losses, damages for pain and suffering, and litigation 
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costs.296  Fourth, whistle-blowers can be given the opportunity to 
report through independent reporting channels.297 
It is widely accepted that the existence of good whistleblowing 
laws leads to increased transparency and market integrity,298 which 
are both beneficial for individuals and society at large. Rewarding 
those who genuinely blow the whistle is instrumental to the success of 
such laws. However, to ensure that we are rewarding the true 
contributors, the payment of rewards should be contingent upon the 
prosecutorial betting of the credibility of the whistle-blower’s 
information, using the information to win the prosecution, and the 
decision of the court that the information provided by the whistle-
blower was important for the successful conviction, which will reduce 
falsification by such informers.299 
This reinforces the need for an effective whistle-blower 
program. However, the program must be well-designed and fit for the 
purpose depending on local needs because one-size may not fit all. 
Countries, like Bangladesh, wishing to have an effective legal regime 
should earnestly consider the necessary features of such laws in 
reviewing and drafting their laws, as the preceding discussions 
demonstrate. To ascribe certainty to the law about receiving useful 
dividends, an amendment to the reward provisions in the WBPA 2011 
is in order. Law derives its intrinsic force from its enforcement 
potential.  Law cannot benefit anyone unless it is voluntarily complied 
with, or efficiently enforced, by competent authorities.300 This notion 
also applies to black money.301 
F. Strengthening Enforcement of the Law 
Law enforcement is critical for the realization of the ends 
stated or inherent in a particular law.302 Katharina Pistor found in a 
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institutions engaged in the enforcement of laws is much more 
important than the quality of the law itself.303 In a corruption context, 
Henry Carey, an American professor of political science, highly 
emphasized the enforcement of law as viable solution.304 The idea of 
offering amnesty to BMHs intrinsically emanates from manifested 
failure in enforcement of laws. But strict penalty is the solution to the 
black money problem, at least in the context of Bangladesh, as proven 
over the past five decades. Experts spell out that “[t]he fear factor 
might generate far more benefit than what is gained through the 
special offer extended from time to time.”305 
A non-political but army-backed short-lived caretaker 
government was able to whiten the largest amount of illicit money in 
the history during fiscal year 2007–2008 until 2020–2021 when the 
immediate past prime minister felt compelled to legalize her illicit cash 
paying penalty tax in addition to regular taxes. The only reason for 
that success was infliction of fear of enforcement of law. In the context 
of Bangladesh, experts argue that “the government, instead of offering 
a special facility to legalize black money, should go after the holders of 
the same. Based on intelligence work, the taxmen need to conduct 
raids to locate black money, confiscate it and mete out punishment to 
its holders.” 306 
A former NBR member recently remarks that the whitening 
opportunity provision was needed simply because of poor 
enforcement of laws.307 Bangladesh does have legal regime to combat 
corruption and other offenses generating black money, though not 
flawless, as discussed earlier, but they are invisible in practice, and the 
successive governments became violators of those laws by offering 
amnesties. The responsible and accountable governance essentially 
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entails the strict application of the rule of law.308 Hence, law 
enforcement is a greater problem than the words of the law. This is so 
mainly because of undue political favoritism, bureaucratic corruption, 
and avoidance by the government to grand corruption. Pointing to 
enforcement weaknesses, opposition legislators lambasted the 
government at the parliament on June 7, 2021 for unabated capital 
flights as well as corruption. The deputy leader of opposition at the 
Parliament claims that those who are involved in massive financial 
irregularities are not facing any hurdle, whereas those who are making 
those illicit activities public are facing various problems.309 In 
response, the Finance Minister asked the legislators to provide names 
of the money launderers, claiming that “he does not know” the names 
of such offenders.310 By contrast, the government Financial Intelligence 
Unit (BFIU) has found evidence of 1,024 incidents of money 
laundering over the last five financial years and they have provided 
detailed information on those transactions to the revenant authorities 
of the government.311 Some reported offenders have been prosecuted, 
but all are without any outcomes thus far. It is commonly believed that 
BMHs do not utilize these opportunities to whiten their ill-gotten 
assets simply because of a lack of enforcement against those who pay 
no heed to the government’s calls.312 TI reports maintain that 
corruption is on the rise due to lack of visible punishment, and that 
political loyalists remain unharmed.313 
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The existence of laws has impact on all people in refraining 
from committing wrongs, nevertheless an offense is committed when 
one’s resistance is overpowered jointly by high temptation and 
favourable environment. Such an environment is stiffened by laxity in 
enforcement. Hence, good strict enforcement records can bring home 
the law’s desired objects. Referring to Caiden’s research on success in 
combating corruption, Gregory states that: 
It is hard to take issue with Caiden’s … assertion that 
among several key factors explaining the difference 
between those countries where corruption is “an 
incidental fact of life” and those in which it is “a way of 
life” is the “Strict application of the rule of law without 
fear or favour by impartial judges” in the former 
jurisdictions, which “needs to be enforced throughout 
the legal and criminal justice systems from top to 
bottom… [emphasis in original].314 
Enforcement problems are multifaceted in Bangladesh. As an 
antipathetic to the much-disputed whitening opportunity, an expert 
Bangladeshi economist comments that “tax administration can’t 
monitor properly. Even if it catches a tax-dodger, the case is settled 
through a corrupt means. As a result, the government is deprived of 
revenue.”315 This claim is evidenced by the information provided by 
the NBR itself, while the tax authority discloses that although tax 
return has been made compulsory for all tax identification number 
(TIN) holders with a few exceptions, most of them evaded filing their 
returns.316As per the NBR data, around 54 percent of the country’s 
individual TIN holders (2.20 million out of 4.06 million TIN holders)  
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improvement, only 47.5 percent  submitted returns in the fiscal year 
2020–2021, which constitutes only 1.44 percent of its 167.5 million total 
population.317 It is important to note that there were at least 75,563 
multimillionaire individuals, and the tax free threshold is only BDT 
250,000 (US $3012).318 
Amid such a grim picture of individual taxpayers, the record 
of corporate tax returns is not pleasing either. As reported in May 2019, 
the data of the NBR and the Financial Reporting Council shows that 
there are a total of 1,65,500 companies registered with the office of the 
Registrar of Joint Stock Companies.319 Of them, 1,11,000 did not submit 
tax return, and those returns that were submitted included 33,000 with 
“fraudulent audit reports” by forging the signatures of chartered 
accountants.320 Another report claims that 12,187 companies have 
evaded taxes for a long time through audit report frauds, which have 
inflated the financial statements for bank loans and deflated profits to 
evade tax, as found by a high-powered taskforce formed by the 
NBR.321 The taskforce discovered that 28,187 companies filed income 
tax returns in 2019. Of these, 16,000 companies have submitted 
“actual” audit reports, while the audit reports of the remaining 12,187 
organizations submitted to tax office were “fabricated” to evade 
taxes.322 
While auditors are obligated to check financial frauds, many of 
them have turned to be architects of such deceptions. For example, in 
2020, three top auditing firms were held responsible by the country’s 
central bank for helping scam-ridden Crescent Group in committing 
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multidimensional offenses such as fraud and forgery.323 Although 
Crescent Group is facing criminal charges, those audit firms received 
only show cause notice and suspension for a small term of 2–3 years 
from their specific services, despite their having violated the Bank-
Company Act of 1991 and the PC1860. 324 Such loose enforcement 
cannot generate deterrence. Further, as of November 2021, only 78,000 
companies out of 176,400 registered companies have “genuine” TINs, 
while the remaining companies have registered with the relevant 
office using “fake” TINs. 325 Evidence has been found that these fake 
reports were made in collaboration with dishonest income tax 
professionals (ITPs) mainly to evade tax.326  The involvement of tax 
officials in irregularities has also been found in several internal 
investigations, however, they often go unpunished, which is regarded 
as one of the major reasons for the poor response of BMHs in 
whitening their assets.327 The above-stated facts present an anarchistic 
nature of tax evasions, which shall have to be addressed without delay. 
The evidence presented above implies the need for 
strengthening, amongst other things, tax administration. Typically 
there are three facets of tax administration. taxpayer registration, 
taxpayer audit, and tax collection. Enhancement of detection of tax 
frauds and punishment can be accomplished by improving all these 
three aspects.328 Alm and Liu prescribe certain ways of doing this: 
[I]ncreasing the number of audits,  using more 
systematic audit selection methods (e.g., ‘scoring’ 
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methods), improving information sharing across 
governmental authorities, increasing penalties for tax 
cheating, applying these penalties often and 
consistently, publicising tax evasion convictions in the 
media as an alternative type of non-financial penalty, 
relying more heavily on source-withholding whenever 
possible, facilitating payments through the banking 
system, granting additional power for collecting 
delinquent accounts, and increasing taxpayer 
registration and identification via better use of third-
party information.329 
The above-quoted actions represent standard methods for 
strengthening enforcement mechanisms and these accord to a 
paradigm that considers the taxpayer to be a “potential criminal who 
must be deterred from cheating.” 330 Alongside improving tax 
administration, other avenues of unlawful conduct and irregularities 
shall have to be dealt with a strong determination demonstrating 
fairness, firmness, and propriety. It has to be ensured that the 
wrongdoers feel the full force of law without any discrimination.  The 
areas of corruption, frauds, tax evasion, and other irregularities are 
publicly known in the country. Most of these wrongdoers include, but 
not limited to, public servants, businesses engaged in imports and 
exports, money launderers, loan defaulters, politicians, tax 
professionals, and accounting professionals. Those whose offenses are 
proved should be adequately punished and chastised, and others 
should be brought back to the right track to prevent further 
irregularities from occurring. This can be achieved by strict and fair 
enforcement of respective laws and by amending the laws where 
needed, as discussed earlier. The situation will obviously get from bad 
to worse, unless punitive measures are taken through enforcement of 
laws, regardless of anyone’s personal identity or position, be it official 
or political. For this, alongside the existing judicial and administrative 
institutions, further authorities may be established to facilitate 
expeditious enforcement and watch the watchers, as outlined below. 
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G. Establishing the Office of Ombudsman 
An Ombudsman is typically charged with representing public 
interests by investigating and addressing complaints of 
misadministration or contravention of laws.331  Lin and Hu define 
Ombudsmen as being “alternate dispute resolution practitioners that 
resolve individual complaints and use the outcomes of those 
resolutions to identify and rectify systemic problems.”332 The office of 
Ombudsman is used in many countries worldwide in order to ensure 
increased transparency and accountability of public administration to 
the people.333 Such an office can play a pivotal role to resolve citizens’ 
complaints against nepotism, misuse of powers, abuse of people’s 
rights, and malpractice in the public administration at all levels in 
Bangladesh.334 The drafters of the Constitution prophetically 
envisioned the necessity of Ombudsman, as evident in its provision of 
empowering Parliament to establish the office of Ombudsman 
prevalent since its adoption in 1972. Article 77 of the Constitution 
reads that “Parliament may, by law, provide for the establishment of 
the office of Ombudsman . . . The Ombudsman shall exercise such 
powers and perform such functions as Parliament may, by law, 
determine, including the power to investigate any action taken by a 
Ministry, a public officer or a statutory public authority.” 
The Parliament of Bangladesh has explicit powers, and an 
implicit responsibility, to create the position of Ombudsman with 
extensive powers to investigate corruption and irregularities by public 
authorities. Exercising this power, the Parliament enacted the 
Ombudsman Act of 1980 (OA 1980) to pave the way to establish an 
office of Ombudsman in Bangladesh.335 The purpose of the OA 1980 is 
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“to provide for the establishment of the office of Ombudsman and to 
define his powers and functions.”336 Consistently, it provides that 
“[t]here shall be an Ombudsman who shall be appointed by the 
President on the recommendation of Parliament . . . Parliament shall 
recommend for appointment as Ombudsman a person of known legal 
or administrative ability and conspicuous integrity.”337 
Correspondingly, the Parliament legislated the Tax Ombudsman Act 
of 2005 (TOA 2005), and the President appointed Mr Khairuzzaman 
Chowdhury as the country’s first ever, and obviously the last to date, 
Ombudsman who took office on July 9, 2006338 for a four-year term.339 
Notably, it was enacted mainly heeding to the pressure of donor 
agencies including the World Bank, which threatened to revoke a 
donation of US $200million.340 Regrettably, the government did not 
make further appointments to the office.341 Instead, the government 
repealed the TOA 2005 by the Tax Ombudsman (Abolition) Act of 2011 
with immediate effect from June 22, 2011. 
It is conceivable from the creation of such an office 
unprecedentedly in Bangladesh that the government realized the 
prevalence of massive irregularities in tax offices, although the 
government that made the law did not appoint anyone to the 
position.342 At the beginning, it was a good initiative, though there 
were flaws in the TOA 2005, which could be easily remedied by the 
Parliament. Instead, the finance minister of the time (2011) said “I am 
astonished at how such an institution had been set up, which does not 
have any power. The judgment of the tax ombudsman depends on 
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me.”343 Conceivably, the finance minister referred to the provisions in 
sections 21 and 25 of the TOA 2005. Section 21(2) stated that if the NBR 
is unable to implement the recommendation(s), it will inform the Tax 
Ombudsman the reason(s) for non-implementation of the 
recommendation(s). The Tax Ombudsman will then bring such cases 
to the notice of the finance minister who may (i) direct the NBR to 
implement the Tax Ombudsman’s recommendation(s); (ii) request the 
Tax Ombudsman to reconsider his recommendation(s); and (iii) take 
such actions as he deems fit. Complementing section 21(2), section 25 
provided that if the NBR or any person becomes aggrieved by any 
recommendation of the Tax Ombudsman, that Board or person may 
make an application to the finance minister through the appropriate 
authority within 60 days of making the recommendation and he shall 
give appropriate order on such application as he deems fit. 
The aforesaid reason given by the finance minister of the time 
for the TOA 2005’s abolition is unjustified in that if the minister 
thought he had excessive authorities over the Tax Ombudsman, the 
government could easily amend the law as it enjoyed an absolute 
majority in the legislature at that time and to date.  Further, one of the 
explicit reasons for the abolition was reported to be the Ombudsman 
not having “much work to do.”344 This reason was unfounded too, as 
the Ombudsman himself disclosed in an interview after finishing his 
term, that “as per law he had taken cognisance of 1,000 plus complaints 
during his tenure although the number of complaints was a few 
thousands. He recommended remedial measures against 700 of them, 
and the NBR implemented all of them.”345 So appreciable was the 
accomplishment of the sole Ombudsman ever, even though people 
were unaware of its existence.346 In relation to the scrapping of the 
office, he referred to the recommendation of the Parliamentary 
Committee on the Ministry of Finance, which had recommended to 
 
343 Star Business Report, Tax Ombudsman’s Office No More, DAILY STAR (BANGL.) 
(July 9, 2010), https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-145974. 
344 Nazmul Ahsan Kalimullah et al., Parliamentary Ombudsman in Bangladesh: 
Overview and Recommendations, 12 J. SE. ASIAN STUDIES 29, 37 (2013) (internal 
citation omitted). 
345 M. Abdul Latif Mondal, Abolishing Tax Ombudsman’s Office, DAILY STAR 
(Bangl.) (Sept. 19, 2010), https://www.thedailystar.net/news-detail-154931. 
346 Id. 
2021 FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY 111 
strengthen the office of the Tax Ombudsman, and an online poll 
conducted by the nation’s most popular English daily found that 75.4 
percent did not support the cabinet decision to abolish the office of Tax 
Ombudsman.347 Further research demonstrates that the actual reasons 
were contradicted by provisions of the TOA 2005 and a number of tax-
related laws and rules, and that the costs associated the adjudication 
process by the Ombudsman were prohibitive.348  The argument that it 
was cost prohibitive is untenable in that the government spent a total 
of only around BDT 10 crore (US $1.205million) over its four year term, 
which presented considerable success in a completely new 
environment.349 
In sum, the abolition was utterly unfair and unjust. The 
establishment of the office of Ombudsman should not be left to the 
government’s discretion, but rather must be considered as a 
constitutional responsibility as well as a dire necessity. As Robert 
Laporte stipulated, both internal and external societies yearn for 
national development to call for increased participation, transparency, 
accountability, and rule of law globally and especially in 
Bangladesh.350 The Ombudsman system is instrumental for good 
governance and is being currently used in many countries across the 
continents.351 Establishing the office of Ombudsman has become as a 
pressing need in Bangladesh, given its appalling corruption records. 
Karim suggested immediate reintroduction of such an office with an 
independent person as Ombudsman for the protection of fundamental 
rights and promotion of social justice and equity of the people in 
Bangladesh.352 
Going beyond the past, the present article recommends more 
than one Ombudsman to expeditiously deal with irregularities in 
different sectors, such taxation, banking, essential public services.  
Article 77 of the Constitution, as cited earlier, does not limit the 
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number of offices of Ombudsman; it depends on the parliament, and 
having more than one is not unprecedented. This recommendation is 
further substantiated below by referring to other countries. A single 
state may have more than one office of Ombudsman with the 
jurisdiction of specific area of public service, such as Tax Ombudsman, 
Financial Ombudsman, Fair Work Ombudsman, Small Business and 
Family Enterprise Ombudsman, as currently in place in Australia.353 
Given the extent of financial irregularities in many countries and the 
corresponding public outcry for justice, financial Ombudsmen are 
increasingly becoming an indispensable Alternative Dispute 
Resolution (ADR) mechanism which may be established in both public 
and private sectors.354 The role of an Ombudsman has gradually 
evolved from a reliable safeguard against maladministration to an 
ADR practitioner.355 
Many countries, both developed and developing alike, such as 
Egypt, Sweden, New Zealand, the UK, Canada, Australia, China and 
India, have established the office of Ombudsman.356 India is the closest 
neighbor of Bangladesh with similar economic and cultural 
backgrounds. There is the office of Banking Ombudsman in 
India.357 Notably, the administration and financial health of Indian 
banks are much better358 than those in Bangladeshi state-owned banks 
which have been suffering from capital inadequacy, as noted 
previously. In addition, India has enacted the Lokpal and Lokayuktas 
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Act of 2013, effective from January 16, 2014, which provides for the 
establishment of the institution of Lokpal, or Ombudsman, to inquire 
into allegations of corruption against certain public offices and 
functionaries including Prime Minister, Ministers, members of 
Parliament.359 Pakistan, which has the reputation of lack of democratic 
governance, has also established the office of Ombudsman.360 The 
European Union established the office of the European Ombudsman 
by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) giving the authority to deal with 
corruption and “cases of maladministration by European Union 
institutions, bodies, offices or agencies.”361 The European Ombudsmen 
“have an essential role when it comes to ensuring transparency in the 
functioning of EU institutions, also investigating claims in cases of 
maladministration” in connection  with abuse of power, refusal to 
provide information, or caused by incorrect procedures.362 China, 
governed by authoritarian regimes, has also established the office of 
Ombudsman with the role of supervision of public offices, with 
jurisdiction over executive malpractice and “deficiency in government 
departments and non-governmental public bodies.”363 Ombudsmen 
can carry out “direct investigations of their own volition” in addition 
to acting on the complaints received from various quarters including 
members of the public, private companies and government bodies.364 
It is appreciable that complaints so received in China are “not filtered 
by legislators, and each ombudsman conveys its primary substantive 
power through the making of recommendations with no general 
power to award remedies.”365 
In Australia, the office of Ombudsman exists at both state and 
federal levels. The professed roles of the Office of the 
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Commonwealth Ombudsman are to safeguard the community in its 
dealings with the Australian Government and to oversee some of the 
private sector organizations.366 The Commonwealth Ombudsman acts 
independently and offers free services of investigation and solution to 
unfair treatments by the Australian Government with anyone.367 The 
office of Ombudsman is regarded as an integrity institution, which 
assists with safeguarding people against abuse of official powers, 
ensuing compliance with the relevant laws, policies and standards in 
Australia.368 The office of Ombudsman confidentially deals with issues 
connecting with corruption and proffers significant values of 
conciliation, privacy, and problem-solving to the Commonwealth 
integrity framework.369 The Ombudsman Act of 1976 in Australia 
empowers the office of Ombudsman to compel anyone to produce 
information and documents that a person possesses and to interrogate 
that person.370 
For just and fair operations, Ombudsmen are to be 
independent persons who must have both individual and political 
independence in order to secure the benefit of such an office. As noted 
scholars Nuannuan Lin and Weijun emphasize, Ombudsmen ought to 
extend their operational focus from the examination of extra-system 
factors to the appraisal of their intra-system issues of concerns, which 
will help them discover the root causes of the systemic problems.371 
Lin and Hu further assert that “the unique role that Ombudsman 
offices can play in resolving systemic issues by identifying latent 
factors that permeate a system and give rise to a recurring pattern of 
failures alongside their more traditional role as ADR practitioners 
focused on dispute resolution.”372 
All this reinforces the justification for having the Office of 
Ombudsman in Bangladesh. The Tax Ombudsman and the proposed 
 
366 What We Do, COMMONWEALTH OMBUDSMAN, https://www.ombudsman.gov.au
/what-we-do (last visited Sept. 17, 2021). 
367 Id. 
368 Grant Hoole & Gabrielle Appleby, Integrity of Purpose: A Legal Process Approach 
to Designing a Federal Anti-Corruption Commission, 38 ADEL. L. R. 397, 413 (2017); 
Ombudsman Act 1976 (Cth) § 15(1) (Austl.). 
369 Hoole & Appleby, supra note 368, at 413–414. 
370 Ombudsman Act 1976 (Austl.), §§ 9, 13. 
371 Lin & Hu, supra note 332, at 113. 
372 Id. at 118–119. 
2021 FIGHTING AGAINST BLACK MONEY 115 
offices of Ombudsman for other financial services, if established, 
should operate in collaboration with the NBR, ACC and Bangladesh 
Bank to minimize, if not to eliminate, financial crime which has been 
cancerous and is eating away the country’s expected economic growth, 
widening the gap between the “haves” and the “have- nots” and 
eroding socio-cultural values. 
H. Promoting International Cooperation 
Black money is a global concern, and most of the money is 
laundered overseas. The laundering of money is normally a 
transnational organized crime involving several jurisdictions with 
different legal standards.373 Because of this international dimension of 
the offense at issue, international cooperation and coordination are 
imperative to effectively address this severe evil which has now 
assumed the appearance of pandemic. A 2009 study conducted by the 
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, showed that the amount 
of proceeds of money laundering per annum was equivalent to 2.7 
percent of the global GDP, equal to about US$1.6 trillion.374  Gilmore 
suggested that three interconnected components of the international 
strategy are to be considered for combating money laundering, which 
are: (a) establishing preventive measures involving private-sector 
actors; (b) strengthening domestic criminal justice systems; and, (c) 
increasing levels of international cooperation.375 A successful effort to 
reduce this offense requires the law to combat each step of laundering 
process, encompassing identification, pursuit, seizure, and 
confiscation or forfeiture of the assets laundered.376 Since each of these 
steps generally takes place in different jurisdictions, which necessitates 
international cooperation to effectively prevent them from happening. 
As explained earlier, a huge amount of black money flies to 
certain overseas destinations every year from Bangladesh. The 
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recipient countries may see an ostensible economic benefit for a short 
term, but they are harming themselves by allowing this money in the 
long run. This is so because the launderers are not ideally law abiding 
citizens of the countries where they were born in, they were educated 
and skilled at the expense of people’s tax in most cases from primary 
to tertiary levels. Whilst they should have a sense of responsibility to 
pay back to their motherland as much as possible, they deliberately 
ruin the nation in contravention of law for personal gains. The 
elimination of this multi-facet problem of black money from any 
country, both the source of generation and opportunity of siphoning 
off must be obliterated. This eradication calls for cooperation between 
the home and host countries of the ill-gotten money. Most popular 
foreign destinations of Bangladeshi BMHs are Switzerland, Canada, 
Australia and Singapore, all of which are developed economies, and 
some of them often preach others about AML control, fairness, 
transparency and accountability. They all have strict AML laws in 
place for their own nations. Now a crucial question begs to be 
answered as to why they entice dishonest people from foreign 
countries to fly in with a specific amount of money without verifying 
their sources of income. The roles of these countries resemble a double 
standard. The problem does not seem to be too complex to overcome 
if the international communities show their willpower. 
In terms of damaging effects of black money, no state is safe 
unless every state is safe. Money laundering is a major way of 
digesting black money by BMHs, whilst it is an international crime.377 
AML control nonetheless still remains an issue of national concerns. 378 
Scholar Maria Bergström describes AML regulation as “a fascinating 
field that not only embraces various types of actors and interests, 
actions, and processes, but also faces challenges and shortcomings on 
a variety of levels and contexts.” 379 Therefore, it warrants international 
cooperation, which should be developed and effected through a 
convention at the initiative of the UN. Admittedly, to address money 
laundering, the UN has already taken some measures, which include 
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the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs 
and Psychotropic Substances of 1988,380 the United Nations 
Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000,381 the 
Political Declaration and Action Plan against Money Laundering of 
1988,382 and the Naples Political Declaration and Global Action Plan 
against Organized Transnational Crime of 1994.383 In addition, there 
are other supportive instruments, such as the United Nations 
Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC)384 and the Financial Action 
Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), an intergovernmental 
organization devoted to promoting policies for protecting the global 
financial system from the offenses of money laundering and terrorist 
financing.385 
However, more needs to be done proactively in practice. The 
first thing which begs urgent action is a strong commitment by the 
international community that no state will allow black money and that 
they implement what they have agreed to do through the ratification 
of the aforesaid international instruments. All States must adhere to 
the core principle of international law of pacta sunt servanda, requiring 
adherence to legally binding agreements386 and representing “an 
elementary and universally agreed principle fundamental to all legal 
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systems.”387 It is not hard to scrutinize the validity of funds flown from 
overseas by host countries, nor is it difficult to combat the black money 
domestically, if the respective governments have the required political 
will.  An exercise of a due diligence inquiry employing the national 
and international agencies should be sufficient to unearth the hidden 
sources of black money. 
Preventing money laundering requires robust domestic 
laws.388 A national law is drafted typically to protect its own interest, 
depending on the choice of lawmakers in most cases. Accordingly, 
Bangladesh has also enacted AML laws. However, those laws are 
likely to have been crafted to keep the interest of legislators 
safeguarded, a majority of whom are businesspeople.389 Scholar Selina 
Keesoony finds that harmonization of the AML laws is necessary to 
create deterrence for actual or potential launderers,390 which can be 
achieved through UN initiatives. To combat money laundering 
forcefully, the vicious act of laundering “must be recognised as a 
tangible threat in its own right,” 391 as “it constitutes a harmful criminal 
activity separate from the predicate offences.”392 
International cooperation is imperative to combat money 
laundering.393 First, all bank secrecy laws should be relaxed, 
information of suspicious deposits should be disclosed to the 
governmental agencies of the depositors’ home country, and banks 
should also ask foreign depositors about the source of the intended 
deposits. Amendments to the conservative banking secrecy laws are 
argued to be essential to weaken the money laundering opportunities, 
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“striking a balance between the State’s interest to curb money 
laundering and the public interest to uphold bank confidentiality.”394 
It can be assured that strengthening AML laws with more teeth will 
not cause an end of bank secrecy laws, as these two sets of laws are 
mutually inclusive.395 Moreover, discarding the bank secrecy laws 
altogether in support of strong AML law is not desirable; instead, a 
balance must be struck between the protection of depositors’ interests 
and prevention of illicit capital flights.396 This is because weakening 
bank secrecy laws in order to strengthen AML rules may cause erosion 
of depositors’ confidence in the banking system, which may in turn 
weaken or destabilize the economy.397 
Switzerland has pioneered the banking secrecy law to confront 
an economic downturn.  The Swiss bank secrecy law begun in 1934 in 
the aftermath of the great recession of the 1930s under the Banking Act 
of 1934 (Switzerland), by which the country wanted to safeguard its 
ability to hide money within the country regardless of the source of 
such funds.398 A breach of this confidentiality was made a criminal 
offense of any banker who disclosed the hidden information.399 Since 
then other countries started following suit in imposing restrictions on 
disclosure of depositors’ information.400 This secrecy is still maintained 
by many countries,401 meaning they are facilitating corruption and 
financial crimes, although the 1934 situation is now non-existent. It is 
a welcome development that Switzerland has started to melt their 
rigidity by relaxing the secrecy requirement, thanks to international 
 
394 Hofilena & Sy, supra note 374, at 140. 
395 See id. 
396 Id. at 138. 
397 Id. 
398 See Sébastien Guex, The Origins of the Swiss Banking Secrecy Law and Its 
Repercussions for Swiss Federal Policy, 74 BUS. HIST. REV. 237, 252 (2000). 
399 Id. at 244. 
400 Hofilena & Sy, supra note 374, at 93 (internal citation omitted) (these countries 
include Switzerland, Singapore, Luxemborg, Lebanon, and the Philippines). 
401 See The Financial Secrecy Index, TAX JUST. NETWORK, https://fsi.taxjustice.net/en/
introduction/introducing-the-fsi (last visited June 11, 2021) (providing financial 
secrecy index and ranking of countries in 2020). 
120 U. MIAMI INT'L & COMP. L. REV. V. 29 
pressure.402 Alongside Switzerland, Canada,403 the U.S., and the UK404 
have also been popular destinations for BMHs in Bangladesh, 
although they claimed themselves to be examples of fairness, 
transparency, and accountability and solicit others to follow them. 
Financial crimes at domestic and international levels cannot be 
permanently stopped without changing this secrecy law. Money 
laundering sometimes involves other serious offenses, such as drug 
trafficking and terrorism financing.405  If the bank asks for the source 
of money before receiving the money for deposit, it can judge at the 
outset whether the money came from a valid source. Even if the 
provisions of such a disclosure requirement are simply put in place, 
they will still be helpful to some extent. In suspicious and dubious 
instances, the bank can make further queries from the potential 
depositors’ home country, which in turn can the check the depositors’ 
tax records of the person and gather other intelligence. This single 
measure can reduce the offense of money laundering considerably. 
Without going into details of the existing international legal 
regime for the prevention of black money flights,406 it can be plausibly 
said that the aforementioned international instruments have failed to 
achieve the overarching goal of stopping money laundering and 
corruption at national and international levels. Although the legal 
frameworks exist at both levels, political will is lacking, arguably 
because of the host country’s apparent financial benefit. Positive 
outcomes cannot be achieved through half-hearted initiatives, but only 
through a firm commitment to combating corruption and money 
laundering. Any sustainable improvement will remain unattainable, 
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unless international communities stand unitedly and firmly against 
black money. 
I. Enhancing Public Awareness and Raising Social 
Resistance 
Corruption is a social disease; hence a social remedy could be 
sought to prevent and cure it. Scholar John Mukum Mbaku postulates 
that “[i]f citizens can scrutinize the activities of civil servants and 
politicians; the latter would find it more difficult to engage in 
corruption and other forms of impunity. Such a process would 
enhance accountability and minimize corruption.”407 One of the 
problems with black money is that BMHs are outwardly admired by 
the society they live in, just because of their wealth, yet they are also 
despised inwardly by many in the same society, who remain silent out 
of fear of retaliation. This is so because money is power, as is generally 
perceived. If society could overtly demonstrate its animosity towards 
the BMHs, then the wrongdoers would better realize that their actions 
for such money are wrong. Public denouncement will certainly be a 
useful deterrent, but the question is “who will tie the bell round 
the neck of the fat cat”? This is a major concern, because BMHs are 
powerful and have the ability to greatly harm others, particularly 
those who are honest and quieter than the noisy malefactors. 
Wrongdoers are small in number; therefore, they can be overpowered 
by social forces if all allies get organized. Younger generations of 
affected societies could take the lead locally by boycotting the corrupt 
people in all social functions, except for religious ones. The corrupt 
people should not be approached for any financial assistance, even for 
good causes, such as building mosques or schools. 
For a national solution, student leaders should take initiative 
and mobilize people across the country to launch a nationwide 
movement, though these days, unfortunately, the integrity of many 
“powerful” student leaders408 is tainted in Bangladesh by their 
 
407 Mbaku, supra note 100, at 346. 
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pursuits of black money, which is another serious problem in itself. 
Thankfully, their number is again small, though they tarnish the image 
of larger student communities. Nevertheless, the movement against 
corruption can be organized by ordinary students, and social media 
platforms can be utilized to mobilize the public initially. Subscribing 
to this view, Yingling goes on to say that “[a]lthough civil disobedience 
has been traditionally justified as an appeal to majority trumping 
considerations, civil disobedience can also be justified as a corrective 
measure when democratic processes break down, even when majority-
trumping considerations are absent.”409 This movement should thus 
begin by boycotting all known dishonest candidates in elections at all 
tiers of governance as a silent protest, before standing firm against 
public servants who are subordinate to politicians. Regarding the 
modern governance system, some commentators view that members 
of a civic community should raise their voice for better public services, 
which will inform the public servants of their responsibility for civic 
duties.410 Likewise, leading voice for human rights Amartya Sen 
commented that the engagement of citizens of a country energizes 
people with the opportunity and motivation to raise their voice against 
injustice and discrimination, and it also promotes human capabilities, 
uplifts fundamental freedoms, and overall makes contribution to 
improve well-being and quality of life of the people.411 In the present 
context of Bangladesh, Sakib preaches that the movement against 
corruption in Bangladesh can be effectively carried out through 
rallying citizens at the grass-roots level.412 He adds that “spontaneous 
participation from youth groups in raising awareness about 
corruption will provide more significant outcomes in society than 
waiting for isomorphic approaches to preventing corruption to 
work.”413 
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A recent successful event of social movements and mass street 
gatherings in Bangladesh took place in 2013, called the “Shahbag 
Movement” (referencing a famous street square in the capital city near 
the University of Dhaka), which concerned the national trial of a top 
war criminal in Bangladesh. The protesters mobilized around half a 
million of people overnight to advocate for increasing the war 
criminal’s sentence from life imprisonment to capital punishment, 
which effectively compelled the government to amend the law almost 
instantaneously by enacting a provision allowing for raising the level 
of punishment on appeal.414 Accordingly, the war criminal was 
awarded the death sentence, which could not have been done without 
the unprecedented mass agitation not seen since Bangladesh 
independence in 1971.415  The “Occupy Wall Street” movement is 
another recent international example of an apolitical social 
demonstration.416 Therefore, students must first commit themselves to 
stop receiving black money and sincerely regard corruption to be an 
odiously wrongful act to be avoided at their work and in social 
engagements. This will provide them with a moral boost to get 
organized against black money and help them to launch a conscious, 
sensible, disciplined, peaceful and constructive movement across the 
country against the evil. Any type of violent movement must be 
avoided to demonstrate full compliance with the law of the land. 
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J. Establishing a New Authority for Coordination and 
Performance Assessment of Financial Regulators 
Bangladesh Bank, NBR, ACC, and the Bangladesh Securities 
and Exchange Commission (BSEC)417 are the four major bodies 
engaged in the regulation of financial issues in Bangladesh, while the 
Bangladesh Financial Intelligence Unit (BFIU) provides intelligence 
reports. The BSEC is directly relevant because of black money 
investment in the market. An empirical study conducted in China 
argues that anti-corruption initiatives require multifaceted 
considerations that necessitate the regulatory mechanism to go beyond 
straight control measures directly against corrupt practices.418 
Regulatory bodies need to be creative in their actions from different 
angles, such as the acts of generation, places of preservation, heads of 
consumption, and ways of exportation of black money. Different 
bodies are tasked with the responsibilities of overseeing or controlling 
different aspects of the proceeds of corruption and other crimes. 
Financial issues are generally complex, which warrant a coordinated 
effort to make the regulation a success, and the accountability of each 
regulator must maximize regulatory fruition. Effective interactions 
between these regulators are necessary for accountability mechanisms 
to produce better anti-corruption outcomes.419 
Putting in place an assessment body to hold different 
regulators accountable for their performance in the financial sector 
was recommended in Australia by the latest Financial Services Royal 
Commission, headed by the Commissioner, the Honourable Kenneth 
Madison Hayne AC QC, in its final report submitted in February 
2019.420 The Royal Commission discovered massive irregularities by 
some financial institutions.421  In pursuance of the Royal Commission’s 
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recommendation 6.14, the Federal Parliament of Australia has enacted 
the Financial Regulator Assessment Authority Act 2021 (Australia) in 
June 2021422 to establish a new authority named the Financial 
Regulator Assessment Authority (FRAA), a body tasked with 
assessing the effectiveness and capability of Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC)423 and Australian Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (APRA)424 in discharging their respective 
statutory functions and meeting their statutory objects.425 FRAA will 
consist of four members, including a Chair, to be appointed by a 
Treasury portfolio minister, and two others appointed members, 
whilst a fourth member is the departmental member, who will be the 
Secretary of the Department of the Treasury or a nominated Senior 
Executive Service (SES) employee.426 Both APRA and ASIC will be 
subject to capability reviews at least once every two financial years by 
FRAA.427 The FRAA will be tasked with complementing and 
expanding on the existing accountability mechanisms, which is 
currently applicable to ASIC and APRA.  The FRAA will not review 
individual enforcement cases, rather it will provide systemic scrutiny 
over the enforcement by ASIC and APRA.428 The object of the 
legislation is to provide for the independent assessment of the 
effectiveness of ASIC and APRA.429 The key functions and powers of 
the FRAA include: (i) conducting biennial assessment of the 
effectiveness of ASIC and APRA and reporting to the Minister on their 
effectiveness;430 (ii)  the Minister can request FRAA to undertake 
capability reviews of either or both of ASIC and APRA and report to 
the Minister;431 and (iii) the FRAA can undertake an assessment itself 
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or in response to the Minister’s request on an ad hoc basis and report 
to the Minister on the effectiveness of both or either ASIC and 
APRA.432 Bangladesh should establish such an authority to coordinate 
and assess conduct of NBR, ACC, Bangladesh Bank, and Bangladesh 
Securities Commission for better outcomes of the financial regulatory 
systems. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Crimes are created by law criminalizing certain conduct for 
restoring and maintaining order in the society. Amnesties to deliberate 
transgressors of the law generate people’s disregard for the legal 
system and erode public confidence in the whole governance system. 
This is what has happened in Bangladesh in relation to the profusion 
of black money, the control of which is of paramount importance to 
establish fairness and justice and to achieve Goal 16 of the SDGs. Law 
must be allowed to take its own course, and a crime should be 
punished in accordance with the spirit of the law which was in place 
at the time of its commission. Any failure in doing so or turning a blind 
eye to such offenses would be the failure of the State in enforcing the 
law, whilst offering amnesties in question amounts to not only 
breaking the law by its makers themselves through exculpating the 
offenders, but also effectively inciting them to commit further crime. 
Such dereliction of state duty would impair the rule of law and 
contribute to an irreparable ailment of lawlessness in the relevant 
areas, as is evident currently in the dominance of black money. After 
all, the mice will play when the cat is away. Corruption is such an 
influential factor that it prompts proponents of the free-market 
economy to rely more on the market itself, and because of the 
incompetence and corruption of government regulators, asserting 
“public interest” regulation would actually worsen the market 
malfeasances instead of helping to improve the situation.433 
This article focuses on the illegality of amnesties offered to 
BMHs in Bangladesh and analyzes their harmful impacts on the 
economy, crimes, and honest taxpayers. The illegality has been shown 
through the violations of specific provisions of the Constitution, the 
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MLPA2012, the ACCA2004, the PC1860, and the PCA1947.434 Besides, 
these amnesties also contravene certain provisions of the UNCAC, 
ICCPR, ICESCR, CEDAW and UNCTOC.435 In investigating responses 
to, and impacts of, the amnesties in question, this article finds that the 
overall response of BMHs to these offers from 1971 to 2021 is 
frustrating because the wrongdoers do not care about the undue 
incentives, This is mainly because of a lack of fright, meaning the 
government has failed to inflict any reasonable amount of fear to 
persuade them to respond. Most of the black money is already in the 
market, and a huge amount of it is laundered overseas every year. 
Although no appreciable benefits have been found, there are several 
specific detrimental effects of such amnesties, as demonstrated in this 
article. These include a significant increase in: (a) corruption; (b) price 
of real estate (driving out honest taxpayers from the market); (c) 
money laundering; (d) deposits by Bangladeshis in Swiss banks; (e) 
defaulted bank loans causing minimum capital shortfalls to most of 
the state-owned banks which have been kept running by the 
government paid taxpayer money as stimuli; and (f) capital flights 
from Bangladesh—many of these BMHs have bought their second 
homes overseas. 
Upon the above disheartening findings, this article seeks to 
work out the ways of punishing the dishonest, protecting the honest, 
preventing the proliferation and exploitation of black money, and 
overall, bringing the ill-gotten assets under control for the benefit of 
the nation. Particular measures that this article solicits to consider are 
precisely mentioned below. First, corruption must be checked strictly, 
and the amnesty should be discontinued immediately. The failed 
whitening provisions must be removed from the Income Tax 
Ordinance of 1984, and no further inclusion of those unfair and 
discriminatory provisions in violation laws should be contemplated. 
Second, the ACC needs to be enabled to reach out all corrupt people 
without any “no go area.” To do so, the ACC must be independent 
both personally and institutionally. Its internal corruption has 
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damaged its image, will continue to do so, and will ultimately result 
in complete erosion of public confidence in the commission, unless the 
dishonesty is eliminated from it. Third, insiders should be incentivized 
by offering statutorily specified worthwhile rewards and be 
guaranteed protection from all ex-post adversities in advance by 
legislation. Fourth, only a credible threat of enforcement of law can 
instill fear of punishment into wrongdoers. The enforcement of law is 
visibly weak, and consequently, wrongdoers take advantage. The 
current laxity in enforcement should be replaced with inevitability 
ensuring utmost neutrality. Fifth, establishing the office of 
Ombudsman as mandated by the Constitution is long overdue. The 
country’s sole office of Ombudsman, Tax Ombudsman, has been 
unduly abolished just after the expiry of the initial four-year tenure of 
the first Ombudsman in 2010. The office of Tax Ombudsman must be 
restored, and two more should be established: one for the country’s 
fragile banking sector, and the other for corruption in other sectors. 
Sixth, black money has been a global concern, hence, no country can 
perfectly control this money alone without useful cooperation from 
international communities. This article identifies the existing 
international framework pertinent to black money and finds that, 
while it works in theory, its fruits can be reaped only through 
extending cooperation in practice. To this end, the UN needs to take 
further initiatives to maximize global cooperation collectively against 
this evil. Seventh, public awareness and corresponding movement are 
critical. Article 7(1) of the Constitution pronounces that “[a]ll powers 
in the Republic belong to the people.”436 People can exercise this power 
lawfully in electing their representatives and peacefully protesting 
corrupt activities by anyone. Boycotting BMHs socially would also be 
useful, though not sufficient. This study recommends enhancing 
public awareness of the persistent abundance of black money and 
stimulating them to unite both locally and nationally, under the 
leadership of honest students, against generation and exploitation of 
black money. Finally, it recommends that a new authority for 
coordination and performance assessment of major financial 
regulators, including the ACC, the NBR, Bangladesh Bank, and the 
BSEC, be formed as a statutory body corporate, in conformity with the 
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new body in Australia, the FRAA.437 The proposed body can be called 
the “Bangladesh Financial Regulator Assessment Authority,” and its 
composition, powers, and functions can be defined in line with those 
of the FRAA from the Financial Regulator Assessment Authority Act 
of 2021 (Australia). 
Culpability of humans cannot be entirely eradicated from any 
society forever. However, it can be minimized by law when the words 
of law correspond to the need of a given society, and enforcement 
thereof is efficient in terms of time, cost, and quality. Bangladesh does 
have laws to deal with different facets of black money, though some of 
them were made reportedly in response to the pressure from donor 
agencies. These laws are not perfect. However, the lack of political will, 
the dearth of enforcement actions, the lack of impartiality, and the 
deficiency in efficiency and honesty have overshadowed the legal 
loopholes. This article identifies some of these weaknesses and 
provides specific recommendations for improvement, having due 
regard to the saying that “a stigma can never be a beauty spot.” These 
recommendations aim to improve the regulatory regime in 
Bangladesh in preventing black money and may also be suitable for 
other countries facing similar issues. 
 
 
437 FRAA is a well-considered creation of the Royal Commission 2017, which 
submitted its final report on February 2019. The report was influenced by the 
Commission’s own comprehensive investigations and existing research. FRAA is yet 
to be formed as the legislation received Governor-General’s assent on June 29, 2021. 
However, it will likely be established soon. 
